HOL Editorial
Friday, March 29, 2019
In 2016, H.E. President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (“Farmaajo”) ran a populist infused campaign, jam-packed with Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopian rhetoric. He promised to defeat and eliminate Al-Shabaab within two years, fight corruption, and promote political stability through reconciliation amongst the various Somali stakeholders. In this editorial, HOL will objectively review the first two years of the Farmaajo Presidency.
President Farmaajo’s anti-Ethiopian Rhetoric
During his campaign, President Farmaajo vehemently opposed Ethiopian hegemony over Somalia’s internal affairs. He exclaimed that Ethiopia should not be allowed to be part of AMISOM because it was a neighbouring country. This rhetoric was massively appealing to the everyday Somali, who felt that Ethiopia’s role in Somalia was negative.
Once elected, President Farmaajo seemed to have a change of heart. Somalis worldwide protested the extradition of Abdikarim Sheikh Muse (“Qalbi Dhagax”) to Ethiopia — a 1977 Ogaden War hero who was serving as leader of the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front). Also, President Farmaajo’s cabinet voted to label the ONLF a terrorist organization. It should be noted that Somalia currently considers the ONLF an outlaw terrorist organization while Ethiopia does not.
Additionally, the foreign policy of the Farmaajo Presidency has alienated Somalia’s closest ally Djibouti, while simultaneously building warm relations with Ethiopia and its new Prime Minister. President Farmaajo signed off four major Somali ports during Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s first one-day visit to Mogadishu on June 16, 2018. There has been a major public outcry because the Somali public has been left in the dark about the four-ports deal. President Farmaajo has failed to share any details of the agreement with the public and has even refused to share details of the agreement with Somalia’s federal parliament.
The public would like to know which exact four ports did President Farmaajo sign off to Ethiopia? How long will the duration of the deal last (10 years, 99 years)? How much percentage will Somalia retain in relations to the ports’ profits? Will Ethiopia’s emerging navy be stationed at one of these four ports?
Candidate Farmaajo and President Farmaajo seem to differ on their foreign policy rhetoric and outlook towards Ethiopia.
Reconciliation and Political Stability
In his first year, he has been accused of utilizing the state security apparatus to kill and maim political dissidents. On December 17, 2017, the Wadajir political party’s headquarters was attacked, six people were killed, and the chairman of Wadajir was illegally detained. Farmaajo’s political opponents accuse him of snuffing out dissent voices, closing political spaces, and denying political opponents the opportunity to hold public gatherings in Mogadishu (which is in violation of articles 18,19, and 20 of Somalia’s Provisional Constitution). The use of excessive and undue force by NISA (National Intelligence and Security Agency) against political opponents is alarming. Farmaajo's detractors say this was made possible by his consolidation of power through the elimination of independent institutions. He is accused of usurping the judiciary and the Office of Auditor General while suspending all other government functions and political programs of peace and state-building efforts.
Moreover, he has alienated federal member states (FMS) by interfering in their internal affairs by unduly influencing and manipulating the outcome of their regional elections in his favour. In the Southwest State (Baidoa), he was successful in influencing the outcome of the election by pouring millions of government resources to get Villa Somalia's man elected. Political analysts worry that this trend may continue as other FMS head to polls.
Changing the course of an FMS-building project through the use of national/federal resources to manipulate regional election outcomes to the whims of Villa Somalia sets a dangerous precedence. The reconciliation and political stability promises he made were merely campaign rhetoric that has yet to materialize.
Security
Before he was elected, President Farmaajo campaigned to completely eliminate the Al-Shabaab insurgency within two years. Today, Al-Shabaab is more potent and pose the biggest threat to the government and the region. Approximately 70 percent of its attacks and casualties took place during the first two years of Farmaajo’s presidency. Al-Shabaab collects taxes from local businesses in Mogadishu, including Bakaraha Market, the biggest marketplace in Somalia. The revenue they generate locally is on par with that raised by Somalia's federal government. Instead of offering public service such as the provision of security, government security is confined around four KM radius with roadblocks and checkpoints. This is for defensive purposes, only to protect government officials while leaving Al-Shabaab to prey on innocent civilians.
At the time of writing, Al-Shabaab has attacked Mogadishu seven times in as many days.
The government has failed to implement the security transition plan (STP) agreed in London in April 2017, a sine qua non for AMISOM forces to draw down. The last operation readiness assessment (ORA) concluded that the Somali National Army lacks training, discipline and equipment to fight against Alshabab. This is compounded by the Somali National Army’s withdrawal from frontline defensive positions due to unpaid salaries for four months. All this points to one thing, that the overall security is worse off under the Farmaajo Presidency than under the previous administration.
Corruption
HOL acknowledges that corruption has been a rampant problem with Somalia prior to the Farmaajo Presidency; the country has topped Transparency International's “Corruption Perceptions Index” for the last years.
With that said, the perceived public perception is that corruption has become more widespread than before, despite the current government’s pronouncement of fighting corruption. In December 2017, the logistical and stipend support by the US government was cancelled due to widespread corruption within the Somali National Army. Patrimonial patronage has become the norm rather than hiring on the basis of merit, as many unqualified individuals have been appointed to government positions. Additionally, off-budget support from the State of Qatar is used for political purposes.
Conclusion
With only two years left, it is our view and the view of the Somali people that Farmaajo must move quickly to work on the massive tasks ahead. This includes completing the constitutional revision process, improving Mogadishu’s security, and completing the electoral process to achieve one-person one-vote by the end of his tenure.
The government must change course as the trajectories of governance is messy and requires political reconciliation, transparency, accountability and delineation of independent government institutions (i.e. the judiciary). These are just some of the core ingredients of good governance. Also, it is imperative that Villa Somalia engages and consults with political opposition groups and political parties on the way forward in achieving one-person-one-vote in 2020 - 2021.
Hiiraan Online Editorial Board