Hiiraan Online

By Mohamed Olad 
Thursday October 9, 2025

 

On September 15, 2025 piece titled “Mustafa Omer: the dissident who became president” and published on Geeska, Abdi-Rizak Warfa attempts to curate the political life of Mustafa Omer, the current president of the Somali region of Ethiopia.

In the said article, Mr Warfa attempts to sketch a general picture of Mustafa’s personal history- a history filled with rebellious personality and fearless activism though grounded in intellect and protection of human rights. The article acknowledges that Mustafa paid a price for this daring personality. He further recognizes that Mustafa’s rise to power symbolizes the change that came to SRS and depicts him as a humble and accessible leader.

In his analysis of Mustafa’s track record, Mr Warfa makes the case that contradictions in Mustafa’s leadership style, mishandling of the ONLF file, entrenching clannism and excess dependence on the federal government might undermine Mustafa’s legacy in governance.

So, its in the spirit of enriching the discourse on the Somali politics that I crafted this piece as a rejoinder to and a review of Mr Warfa’s piece on Mustafa’s personal history and political life based on three basic parameters: factuality, tone and the merits and missteps of the arguments articulated in the article. 
Factuality 
For an academic, who has published numerous articles, Mr Warfa made blunders he could have easily avoided in profiling Mustafa’s personal and political journey including the schools he attended, his employment record and his interactions with the Abdi Iley regime, the former SRS president. These are errors Warfa could have avoided by exercising the due diligence required for a task like this given his extensive contacts inside and outside the region including within the administration.

A quick fact-checking about Mustafa would have revealed that Mustafa attended his high school in Harar and not in Degahbour, served in the Teachers Training College (TTC) as a director and not as a teacher or a Vice Director, and left the regional government way before Abdi Iley came to a position of authority during Abdirashid Dulane’s administration. For the casual observer, it might seem unnecessary to point out these basic errors. However, a critical mind would cast a doubt whether Mr Warfa got his analysis about Mustafa’s track record in governance right, given that he failed to straighten out the basic evidence necessary for a profiling piece like his.

In other words, it raises a series of cascading questions about the author, his approach and the credibility of this particular work.  
Tone
Let us start with Mr Warfa’s framing of profiling President Mustafa ‘that it is risky business to profile a sitting president. Such a framing of the personal risks inherent in the profiling of President Mustafa contradicts Mr Warfa’s own depiction of Mustafa not only as someone humble and accessible but also someone who enjoys intellectual debates. It also refutes Mr Warfa’s argument in the article that there is freedom of expression in the region-despite occasional limitations.

Mr. Warfa's perspective on the challenges to freedom of expression is one interpretation of the current climate. However, an alternative reading of the facts would highlight the significant distance from past regimes that systematically imprisoned and tortured dissenters. The absence of political prisoners in SRS today, coupled with the robust public criticism of leadership from various quarters, presents a strong case that the landscape for free expression is fundamentally different and far less restricted than the author's argument suggests.

Throughout Warfa’s article, the underlying tone suggests a poorly disguised discontent with the incumbent president, his party, and how they run the affairs of the Somali region. To stain Mustafa’s reputation, Mr Warfa’s characterization of calling Mustafa a ‘Pen Tadaaqi’, as ‘metaphorical’, doesn’t cut it. Tadaaqi is a derogatory name given to the reckless TPLF-armed militias and the political stooges that were the tools of oppression in the Somali region for almost three decades. In not so unsubtle way, Mr Warfa’s tone reveals that he is unhappy with the change of guard in the region in 2018 and detests the word ‘change’ as a result. He writes:“ Their favorite cliché? Isbaddelka ka hor—a phrase that translates to ‘before the change’ connoting the subtler “before we came to power.” It colors every statement they utter, a kind of bismillah that jumpstarts their claims. But that is only half the story.”

In many instances, Mr Warfa quotes ghost analysts and opponents to mask what can be clearly deduced as though they are his personal views given how he fails to provide any form of reference or empirical evidence for those quotes or the claims they conjure. One such quote is the one that claims “Mustafa embodied the spirit of defiance against authoritarianism, speaking truth to power with remarkable courage. In the office, however, he has at times replicated the very patterns he once denounced. Where he once championed inclusivity, he now presides over exclusionary restructurings that stir resentment.”.

As a follow writer, it my view that Mr Warfa’s piece would have been more stronger with concrete attribution, naming analysts, giving context for opponents, or providing evidence.

A few similar quotes that suffer from the same logical or evidential traits of any coherently sound arguments that could be highlighted without being exhaustive include: “Others accuse him of manufacturing divisions to consolidate authority”. “He governs through conflict,” said one analyst. “He squandered a historic opportunity to build lasting institutions,” lamented another. A particularly sharp critique charged that has…. “governance, instead of being a platform for unity, is too frequently wielded as an instrument of control.”

Whether these quote casts a negative or positive light on Mustafa or the region is beyond the point. It is the duty of the intellectual, Mr Warfa in this case, to argue his case rather than hiding behind what might seem as fabricated quotes.

In his analysis of Mustafa’s leadership style and the positions he has taken on key political and policy issues to thread together in a fitting profile, Mr Warfa at least deserves credit in his attempt to create a profile that fits the man from his policies and decisions.

However, Warfa’s characterization of Mustafa’s positions concerning key issues doesn’t withstand simple scrutiny and deserves some level of unpacking. For example, Warfa accuses President Mustafa of exclusion and centralization, which begs the question; is this true?

A short, unequivocal answer to that would be; No. The Somali region is more inclusive than it has ever been: all communities including the historically marginalized communities such as the Jareerwayn and Gabooye are in the parliament and cabinet; the opposition has members in the executive councils at the regional, zonal and district levels; all zones and districts (geographic areas) are represented in the executive, legislative and judiciary; and over 30 percent of the regional assembly are women. State and ruling party institutions are organized in a manner that facilitates consensus and collective action, constraining the state president from taking unilateral action and making decisions without consultation.
Another concrete evidence of inclusivity is recent administrative restructuring that allocated  districts to previously disenfranchised communities in remote border areas such as in Shaakisa (El Kere), Jaarso, Garanuugle (Gaashaamo), Duuban, Buuhoodle, Burqayar.

The never-ending cry often heard from the President’s allies and detractors alike; ‘that decisions are slow, changes are taking too long, … ‘ and so on is testament to the fact that the current president doesn’t wield power let alone rule as ‘one man’ like almost all of his predecessors.

The economy, which has been monopolized by the previous regime and their cronies, has been opened up to give everyone an equal opportunity to participate in the new economic order of the region, where the private sector and personal enterprise is the priority.

Isbadalka-ka-hor, to use Mr Warfa’s much detested word, entire economic sectors such as construction, duty-free food imports, distribution channels for beverage and other household goods were held through brutally enforced monopoliztic chokehold by Abdi Iley’s family and few of their cronies.

It is possible that some communities that held excessive power in the past have lost some positions to accommodate others and minorities. However, it is through corrective measures such as bringing disenfranchised border communities in Wester Sitti, Liban, Afdher or Warder Zones or giving voice to the various marginalized groups that inclusivity and state legitimacy have been realized, contributing to the peace and stability the region enjoys today.

By analyzing how Mustafa handled the ONLF file, Mr Warfa accuses him of undermining the front’s unity and strength. This accusation might at first glance, be considered true in the sense that Mustafa as one of the leaders of the ruling Prosperity Party, would at best hope for a weak competitor or might even work on undermining them.

However, a more appropriate question would be: Is it the responsibility of any ruling party to work on strengthening the opposition party? Do the Republicans in the US work on strengthening the Democrats?
A more pertinent truth about the history of ONLF shows that fragmentation was a Fate Accompli for such an archaic party that came into being to respond to political realities of the early 1980s. To argue that factionalism and disunity among the ONLF leadership are the work of Mustafa is to ignore the front’s history and to oversimplify the contemporary struggles of ONLF to transition from an armed insurgency to a political party. This transition is expected to be naturally messy even if you remove the leadership of the region from the equation. Mr Warfa also alludes that the persistence of clan politics has something to do with how Mustafa approached the ONLF file. To the contrary, ONLF, a clan-based Ogadeni front, tried to camouflage itself as a Somali nationalist party and it failed miserably.

Mr Warfa also argues that clannism grew under Mustafa when he decried “though [Mustafa] condemns clan politics, his policies often reproduce the same patronage and exclusionary patterns as his predecessor, entrenching the very divisions he vowed to overcome”. A prime example of this is the recently formed clan-based districts and zones, Warfa maintains.

Contrary to Warfa’s claim, available evidence demonstrates that the recent administrative restructuring with all its shortcomings, contributed to the extension of state authority to areas and communities that were never recognized or received government services.

Finally, Mr Warfa’s argument that Mustafa is subservient to the federal government because he relies on it for a budget is neither here nor there. The roles of the federal and state governments are enshrined in the Constitution and all state leaders, including Mustafa, President of SRS, are bound by the rules of the country. To the credit of the federal government and current Prime Minister, Dr Abiy Ahmed, the Somali region enjoys full autonomy, enabling the state to make a difference in the lives of the people and improving accountability.

On the questions of the ‘regional government depending on the federal government’ as something that erodes the its autonomy, is logical flaw or lack of proper understanding about the nature and the dynamics of central-regional governments within a federal system. The federal government is the organ entrusted on macroeconomic issues such subsidies to regions, customs administration and international trade. The region government neither receives nor relies on specific federal subsidies for its developmental functions. The Somali regional government receives its share of a federal subsides to regions based on a national budget and revenue formula just like any other region in the Ethiopian Federation. So, no! The regional government doesn’t rely on federal subsidies. It collects its own state tax revenue while also receiving its share of the national revenue as collected by the federal government through a budget/resource sharing formula just like any other region.

However, if the question is the share of the Somali regional budget as covered by local and regional revenue sources, well, that’s quite easy. Before the 2018 change of guard in the region, the share of the total regional budget financed by regional taxes was 15% while the federal government covered the remaining 85%. Now, the regional government sources 50% of its budget from local sources while the rest is covered by the federal government through grants and subsidies.
Parting shot

Mr Warfa should be admired for the time and energy he put into writing about a public figure whose decisions impact the lives of millions in the Somali region. However, his writing shows- both in cadence and content- that he is a disguised critic. Nothing is wrong with that either.

Scrutinized in the strict meaning of the term, nonetheless, Mr Warfa’s piece is not about profiling Mustafa’s political life. It is rather an attempt to give credence- under the guise of scholarly work, to the hollow propaganda a hodgepodge of political opposition groups inside and outside the region, remnants and sympathizers Abdi Iley’s regime, and some factions of the ONLF have been spreading over the last few months!

These various groups and individuals see the political coherence within the Somali region, the great relations with the centre, the inclusive state institutions, the open economy, the visible progress in health care, water, infrastructure and urban development as a misfortune that befell them.
The larger public sees the overall change and progress in the region for what it is!