Bashir M. Sheikh-Ali, J.D., Ph.D. *
Monday June 12, 2023
Shortly
after Mr. Hamza Abdi Barre was appointed the Prime Minister, I published an
opinion paper on HOL [[1]]
urging him to create a government that adheres to the constitutional structure
in the Provisional Constitution. There, I
described the structure of the government created by Somalia’s Provisional Constitution
and explained how the document creates a national government which requires federalism
with separation of powers in one Chapter and a parliamentary government which
does not require separation of powers in another Chapter. The opinion paper also illustrated how reconciling
the two conflicting structural features is not conceptually difficult but pointed
out that it will likely be contentious.
Last
month, the National Consultation Counsel (“NCC”) proposed abolishing the parliamentary
election of the President and the appointment of the Prime Minister and replacing
it with a president and a vice president elected in a general one‑person-one-vote
election. This proposal (“the NCC
Proposal”) reconciles the conflicting structural feature described above by effectively
removing the parliamentary aspect from the Provisional Constitution. As expected, this proposal was met with objections
from politicians albeit with a narrow focus on the proposal itself without
stepping back and examining the structural consequences of this proposed change
within the framework of the Provisional Constitution. As described below in more detail, if the NCC
Proposal is adopted, the resulting constitution will create a traditional
federal government composed of two co-sovereigns—the federal and member state
governments – with a president as the head of both the state and the federal government.
Adopting the presidential federal system also addresses an obstacle that unnecessarily
complicated Somalia’s path to complete the Provisional Constitution. Before I dive into that discussion, let me touch
on several confusing notions.
First,
the Provisional Constitution has been adopted in a political agreement.
However, it has not been completed or ratified for a variety of reasons. As a result, it remains in a draft stage. Draft documents are meant to be modified
until they are completed and finalized.
Completion of any document requires a mix of addition, deletion, and/or
modification of certain aspects of the document. Indeed, one of the frustrations Somalis often
raise against previous administrations is that they failed to move the draft
document into completion and ratification.
The NCC’s Proposal is a welcome step that moves the country in the right
direction.
Second,
under Article 132 of the Provisional Constitution, “[t]he Federal Government or
a Federal Members State government, a member of the Federal Parliament or a
petition signed by at least 40,000 citizens may initiate the amendment
process.” Emphasis added. Thus, there
is nothing procedurally improper with the federal government or a member state
proposing an amendment. The NCC includes
the head of the state, the head of the federal government, and the presidents
of the member states. As such, NCC is
clearly an entity that may initiate an amendment process within the meaning of
article 132 of the Provisional Constitution.
Third, Article 54 provides, “[t]he
allocation of powers and resources shall be negotiated and agreed upon
by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States,” vesting the authority
to allocate powers in the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. Emphasis added. Whether Somalia adopts a parliamentary
or a presidential federal system is the type of allocation of powers
contemplated by Article 54 of the Provisional Constitution. Further, the NCC is composed of the president
(the head of the state under Article 87), the prime minister (the head of the
federal government under Article 100), and member state presidents. As such, the NCC represents both “the Federal Government
and the Federal Member States” and is therefore the right entity to address any
constitutional issues related to allocation of powers.
Fourth,
although Somalis from all walks appear to endorse a government with “checks and
balances,” the concept seems to be often misunderstood. Checks and balances within constitutional
framework are not accomplished through raising “checks and balances” concerns in
political debates but through the creation of an appropriate government
structure that accomplishes the objective.
Federalism is specifically designed to provide such a structure. In a federal system, the executive,
legislative and judicial branches typically have specifically allocated powers
such that if each does its job right, the whole system thrives. The duty of each of the three branches is to
support the constitutional framework of separation of powers, which is the core
feature for providing checks and balances within a federal system. Thus, if Somalis
want a government with checks and balances, they should seek to build a
government structure with an unambiguous separation of powers. Unfortunately, by including a parliamentary
aspect to the structure of the government, the Provisional Constitution
undermines this core feature of federalism.
The NCC’s Proposal corrects that grave mistake.
Fifth,
it bears remembering that federalism is not a natural system of governance where
the power fans from a central authority.
Instead, federalism requires careful allocation of powers between two
co-sovereigns and within each sovereign.
If not done right, Somalis will be at each other’s throat forever. The NCC’s Proposed structural change and the
debate that ensued create one of those moments that will define Somalia’s
future. Rather than politicizing it, Somalis should take this debate very
seriously without losing track of the objective of creating a federal system
that works for all Somalis. Objectively
reviewing the structure of the government created by the Provisional
Constitution, there is no doubt that inclusion of a parliamentary feature to
the federal government is an obstacle for creating a federal system with separation
of powers and proper checks and balances.
The NCC’s Proposal removes this obstacle.
Finally, Article
132 of the Provisional Constitution (on “Provisions Applicable to an Amendment
to the Constitution”) provides “neither House of Parliament may consider an
amendment to the Founding Principles mentioned in Chapter 1 of this
Constitution.” By expressly excluding
Founding Principles from the amendment process, the Provisional Constitution permits
amendments to all other features in the document. Close analysis of the Founding Principles show
that Article 132 is seeking to protect federalism principles in the Provisional
Constitution. Article 3 (the “Founding
Principles”) include five clauses four of which describe a federal government and
none of which refers to a parliamentary government. The fifth clause urges inclusion of women in
the “three branches of the government,” which is generic to any type of
government. The contrast in how federalism and parliamentary aspects of the
government are treated in the Founding Principles is strong evidence that the
protected Founding Principle of Chapter 1 is federalism, which the NCC’s Proposal
leaves intact. The only impact of the NCC’s Proposal has on the federalism
aspects of the government is the title or the position of the head of the
executive branch of the federal government.
Whereas an unelected prime minister is the head of the executive branch
in the current parliamentary federal government, an elected president would be
the head of the government in a presidential federal system. Having the elected president be the head of
the executive branch strengthens the Founding Principles by adding an
additional layer of accountability that is unavailable when the head of the
executive branch is an unelected officer.
This additional accountability feature alone could well be the reason to
choose the proposed presidential federalism over the current parliamentary
federalism.
Government
Structure: With or Without the NCC’s Proposal
I. Federalism Aspects
of the Government
The
NCC’s Proposal does not make any material change to the federalism aspect of
Somalia’s government. With or without
the NCC’s Proposal, the Provisional Constitution creates a Federal Government
with separation of powers. Under Article
3 of the Provisional Constitution (the Founding Principles Article),
[t]he
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia promotes human rights,
the rule of law, general standards of international law, justice, participatory
consultative and inclusive government, and the separation of powers between
the legislature, executive and an independent judiciary,[[2]]
in order to ensure accountability, efficiency and responsiveness to the
interests of the people.
Emphasis
added. Another Founding Principles of
Article 3 calls for federalism more explicitly “Federal Republic of Somalia is
founded upon the fundamental principles of power sharing in a federal system.” Id.
These Founding Principles are typical of the constitutions of liberal
democracies where the individual rights and liberties are protected through a
separation of powers between the three power centers of the government: the
executive, the legislative, and the judiciary branches. While the separation of powers in Article 3
clearly applies to the federal government, member state government structures are
likely to follow the same pattern as the federal government.
To
be clear, the three branches of the federal government rely on each other for
maintaining the federal system even though their powers are separated. The legislative branch has the spending power
and passes all the laws; the executive branch leads the government agenda and
executes the laws; and the judiciary branch ensures that the adopted executive
agenda and other laws are not inconsistent with the constitution. If the
judiciary branch oversteps its powers to check on how the legislative and
executive branches exercise their powers, it is to the interest, if not the
duty, of the latter two branches to address judiciary branch’s overreach
through legislation that does not take away or modify any constitutional power
allocated to it. With its spending powers, the legislative branch ensures that
the executive and judiciary branches are properly funded such that they can
fulfill their constitutional duties. If each branch attends to its duties, the
system will flourish and help establish a thriving society. It should be clear by now that the three
branches of a federal government can have somewhat contentious relationship,
each making sure that the other two stay within the boundaries of the powers
allocated to them.
In
federalism, there is also a division of power between member states on the one
side and the federal government on the other side. Thus, by adopting a federal system, the
Provisional Constitution necessarily calls for dividing the governmental powers
between the federal and member state governments. Reading the federalism and separation of
powers clauses together leads to the conclusion that the Provisional
Constitution creates a federal government with separation of powers between the
federal and member states and between the executive, the legislative, and the
judiciary branches of each sovereign (with the assumption that member states
adopt separation of powers principles).
The table below summarizes the six government branches that co-exist in
a federal system assuming the states adopt separation of powers
principles.
Sovereign
Branch
|
Federal
|
Member State
|
Executive
|
√
|
√
|
Legislative
|
√
|
√
|
Judiciary
|
√
|
√
|
Although
most of the powers can be cleanly divided between the federal and the member
state governments (the so-called exclusive powers), there are some areas of
people’s life that both the federal and the member state governments often
function simultaneously (the so-called concurrent powers). When the member state and the federal
government have concurrent powers, however, all federal systems call for a
supremacy clause where the federal government’s power (as limited by the constitution)
is supreme to that of the member state.
See Article 4 of the Provisional Constitution (“the constitution of the
Federal Republic of Somalia is the supreme law of the country”). As further discussed below, it is the duty of
Somalia’s leaders to define the delicate boundaries between and within each of the
federal and the member state governments such that each of the six power
centers (listed in the table above) affecting the lives of individual citizens
on daily basis can exercise their specific powers without violating individual
rights.
II.
Parliamentarian Aspects of the Government
Without the NCC’s Proposal,
the Provisional Constitution implicitly creates a parliamentary government but
doesn’t require separation of powers.
Although the Provisional Constitution explicitly mentions federal
and local governments on numerous occasions, it does not mention parliamentary
government as a system of governance. However, as is typical in the constitution of
a parliamentary government, the Provisional Constitution provides for a
parliamentary process for electing a president (by the Houses of the Federal
Parliament) with the power to appoint a Prime Minister. See Articles 89 and
90. As is also typical in parliamentary
governments, Article 97 of the Provisional Constitution gives the Prime Minster
the power to “appoint deputy prime ministers, ministers, state ministers, and
deputy ministers” and declares “The executive power of the Federal Government
shall be vested in the Council of Ministers.” Reading Articles 89, 90, and 97 together leads
to the unmistakable conclusion that the Provisional Constitution is attempting
to create a parliamentary government even if it does not explicitly state
so.
Further, the parliamentary
aspect of the government in the Provisional Constitution does not adopt a
separation of the three branches (as modern parliamentary federal systems do)
or no separation between the legislative and the executive branches (as
traditional parliamentary systems do). Instead,
the Provisional Constitution creates a parliamentary government which does not
require separation of powers. This is inconstant with “the separation of powers
between the legislature, executive and an independent judiciary” required by
the federalism clauses in the Provisional Constitution. The NCC’s Proposal effectively removes the
parliamentary aspect from Somalia’s Provisional Constitution, harmonizes the
conflicting separation of powers clauses, and leads to a government with clear
structures.
Federalism
Friction Points Need to be Addressed
An important remaining
core federalism question is how to divide the powers and resources between the federal
and member state governments. This power allocation falls with the
authorization under Article 54, which provides “[t]he allocation of powers and
resources shall be negotiated and agreed upon by the Federal
Government and the Federal Member States.” Emphasis added. There have been some movements on the
resources aspect of the power sharing although they have not been completed
yet. However, there does not seem to
have been much debate on other outstanding power sharing issues. The NCC should start addressing other power sharing
issues within the federalism framework as mandated by Article 54. The Provisional Constitution reserves for the
federal government matters concerning foreign affairs, national defense, citizenship
and immigration, and monetary policy. The
NCC should lead the country in defining how the federal and member state
government would regulate other aspects of citizens’ lives.
Addressing the division
of power between the federal and member state governments would require negotiations
between Somali leaders to decide how much power the member states should retain
and how much power should be given to the federal government, keeping in mind
that the purpose of power sharing is not deprive the federal government of
necessary powers but to create a federal government that can protect the nation,
create modern business environment (both for citizens and foreign investors), and
competently represent the country in world stages.
In particular, the
leaders should pay close attention to the federalism friction points that are inevitably
created by the movement of citizens and goods across member state boundary
lines. Introduction of boundaries within
a nation creates friction points that are unique to federalism. As the
country’s safety improves, movement of people and goods will inevitably increase
and having proper rules of engagement will be critical to protect the citizens from
harassments by member states and to foster a national character.
To foster the national
character of the country, federal systems often address federalism friction
points by prohibiting member states from interfering with the personal and
business activities of all nationals regardless of their state citizenship. Federal systems also prohibit member states from
engaging in a preferential treatment of their citizens over non-citizens in the
movement of people or goods and from maintaining border controls to collect taxes
or any other fees. Of course, contraband and security inspections should be
permitted at border crossings as well as within the territory of the member
state. However, those inspections and
control points should strictly be limited to address specific law enforcement
objective unrelated to the movement of people and goods. Member states should also
be free to tax proceeds of the transactions involving goods within its borders
as long as there is no preferential treatment favoring its own citizens (or locally
produced goods) over citizens of (or goods produced in) other member
states. Instead, the member states should
strive for a system where all Somali citizens are free to visit, reside or do
business in the member state of their choosing without any member state interfering
with their activities or discriminating against them. These federalism friction points are common
in federal systems and must be addressed.
Given that the
federalism power division is between the federal government and member states, member
states should reject any attempt by any member state to get a preferential
treatment over the other member states. Instead, all the member states should
be on the same side and the federal government should be on the other side and
all the negotiations should be about where to draw the (power) line that
divides the two types of governments. Negotiators for the member states should
remember that the federal government should be bestowed with all the powers
necessary to restore a national character – otherwise, we will have a
collection of neighboring and potentially warring clan fiefdoms.
In sum, the NCC has
the authority to lead the country to complete the Provisional
Constitution. The NCC’s Proposal, which promotes
federalism, is consistent with the government structure that Somalis have
bargained for as reflected by the drafters’ protection of federalism from
constitutional amendment. Therefore, the legislative branch of the government
is urged to promptly bring this proposal to the floor of the parliament and start
the debate of the proposed amendment to the Provisional Constitution. Further, the NCC should start the process of
addressing federalism friction points to foster the national character of the
government. Federalism will not be
complete until citizens are free to cross member state boundaries seamlessly without
encountering control points or tax collection stations.
Bashir M. Sheikh-Ali, J.D., Ph.D
* The writer is a Somali
American lawyer who practices law in the United States. The opinion in this
paper is his own opinion and should not be attributed to any of his partners,
associates, or colleagues. He can be reached at [email protected].
[1]
Somalia’s
Government Must Adhere to the Constitutional Structure (hiiraan.com)
[2] Textually, Article
3 of the Provisional Constitution calls for the separation of powers of the
three branches of the government—executive, legislative, and independent judiciary. The term “independent” in “independent
judiciary” signals to the public that the judiciary, in addition to having its
separate powers, is an independent branch. Given that the judiciary branch’s
main role is dispute resolution, that it is an independent branch of the
government provides legitimacy that the other two branches do not normally
need. Indeed, the legislative and the executive branches have certain
interdependencies other even though their powers are separated—the executive
branch often proposes and always enforces the law; the legislative branch
passes the law. The judiciary branch does not get involved in the creation or
the enforcement of the laws; it merely settles disputes (public or private) and
interprets the law. An independent
judiciary branch is the most important branch of the government for
safeguarding individual rights.