The rubble from the attack of the Al-Shabab terrorists on the presidential palace of Villa Somalia
by Heikal I. Kenneded
Friday, August 8, 2014
When President Hassan Sheikh was elected almost three years ago, he was too quick to declare to the world at large that Al-Shabab terrorists were “on the path to defeat” and its surviving members were more concerned for their own safety rather than plotting against his government. That is why it is appalling sight to watch lately how Al-Shabab terrorists repeatedly launch surprise attacks at the Presidential palace of Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, where the President, most of the cabinet ministers including the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament live and have their offices. Not to mention the recently tragic target killings of prominent members of the Parliament, with impunity. These sorts of assaults are tantamount to a “decapitation” of the federal government as we know it, which shows the serious security lapse in the country. It is also a testament how the government of Hassan Sheikh has completely lost its vote of confidence and support of the vast majority of the Somali population for the steady deterioration of their lives and the economy, as well as the apathy of the government in dealing with growing security threat. However, the government’s recurring reaction to the worsening insecurity in the capita has been so far to move around security officials like musical chairs, as though that’s going to fix the problem. The pragmatists argue the main reason that the federal government has terribly failed to eliminate the existential threat that Al-Shabab currently poses to the country is that it lacks both national strategy to unite the country and a tactical maneuver in which the government and the AMISOM forces together fight against Al-Shabab.
To build a national strategy, the Somali government needs to target the heart of the problem, which is none other than the severe unemployment rate in the country and lack of opportunity for the country’s largest demographic of young generation, which fosters a sense of fatalism and pessimism, eventually exploited by Al Shabab recruiters. For instance, last month’s deadly attack in the heart of the presidential palace was allegedly carried out by half a dozen of Al Shabab militants wearing the Somali military uniforms led by a young man named Mohamed Muhiyadin whose father worked in Villa Somalia. He was allegedly recruited by his brother in-law who hired him for a mere $200 in order to transport the Al Shabab terrorists with their explosives into Villa Somalia. Ironically, this treacherous incident occurred less than few weeks after President Hassan Sheikh gloated that Mogadishu’s residents were able to break their fasting in peace thanks to the “laudable” efforts and sacrifices of the security apparatus that were put in place. Further, the government needs to put in place a national strategy of rebuilding a united Somali national army, a united army that is free from clan loyalty is critical to Somalia's long-term security. The government must then develop a national security policy that fosters effective institutions, including an impartial judicial structures and a legislative framework that lay the groundwork for a stable democratic government.
Al-Shabab has proven time and time again that they are a resilient bunch of callous terrorists who can strike anytime and anywhere they wish to do so, despite the amassing of foreign troops in Somalia. This worrisome resurgence of Al-Shabab in the capital poses an existential threat to the government because Al Shabaab has mastered the art of guerrilla warfare following years of fighting invading forces: it chooses only battles that it has a chance of winning, and currently has the initiative in the south. These back-to-back attacks at the main seats of the government are raising serious concerns about the viability of the federal government’s ability to any longer hold the country together. In fact, Al-Shabab terrorists have recent years proven that they could project their terror assaults beyond Somalia’s borders by carrying out multiple deadly attacks inside the Kenyan heartland.
Given the fragility of the federal Somali government led by President Hassan Sheik, the country is tragically split into fledging federal states that cater to their clan clientele, not to mention lack of a disciplined and well-paid army, it is impossible to thwart a hardcore terrorist group like Al-Shabab. Notwithstanding building a robust national strategy, a tactical strategy is also paramount in which a tremendous pressure should be brought to bear on the capital city’s security apparatus in order to quell these types of attacks that have the potential to thwart whatever sliver of hope left over for all Somalis to linger on. The government forces in conjunction with AMISOM troops should use a blunt force approach to first clear out the local population that either supports or harbors Al Shabab terrorists, then use air strikes, artillery, and ground forces to root out these jihadist elements that remain. Strategic towns like Barawe and most of the Lower-Juba region offer safe haven against such strikes and they should be targeted for such an offensive.
No more wishful thinking
How much President Hassan Sheikh’s complacency should be blamed for this deadly revival of Al Shabab in the capital to carry out such attacks inside Villa Somalia and other relevant posts, including the House of the Parliament? Quite a lot. In other words, these latest brazen attacks of Al-Shabab militants at the “fortress” of Villa Somalia, where the heads of the nation are not safe in their fortress while the rest of the populace have to live in a state of fear and despair is a bloody reminder of how President Hassan Sheikh undermined the deadly force his government is up against and in the end become sidetracked by other less important tasks, such as the political mechanizations of regional states. Nevertheless, most analysts see such lethal attacks as a possible precursor to a broader military campaign against the government mired by incompetence and complacency to rebuild a robust security forces to dismantle the Al-Shabab terrorist network.
In the end, if President Hassan Sheikh’s government fails to defeat Al-Shabab as soon as possible, the resolve of the people to see them out of Villa Somalia will grow. In fact, the number of MPs in the parliament critical of the President’s dreadful failure to improve the country’s security conditions is already mounting exponentially by the day and it is only a matter of time before another political deadlock sets in. Not to mention the unprecedented early support of the international community has clearly waned simply because they are disappointed with the government’s modest gains on all fronts, including political, judicial and most importantly security. For example, due to the deteriorating security threat in the capital, the Turkish government recently evacuated most of its citizens from the country. The problem is that President Hassan Sheikh’s government is incessantly mired by allegations of systemic corruption and debilitating clan politics in which every step his government takes forward, it seems he’s taking two-steps backward. Most political analysts argue that an adjustment from top to bottom is inevitable because President Hassan Sheikh is caught in a trap of trying to please everyone including his harshest nemesis, which is exactly the antithesis of running a successful administration. Yet, if the President deals in reality rather than rhetoric, the Somali people may surprise him with their unfettered support and therefore rally after his government in his genuine efforts to root out Al Shabab terrorists from their last hiding places.
Finally, while Al-Shabab is obstinately committed to carrying out these deadly attacks against the heads of the Somali government and the seat of government, they have not yet attempted on similar deadly attacks against the AMISOM troops, which now exceed more than 20,000. Thus, the final question on most people’s mind is: where in the world are the AMISOM forces that were supposedly to protect the government? Because the most dismaying aspect of Al-Shabab’s resurgence in the capital is the extent and capriciousness of their attacks wherever and whenever they target despite the heavy presence of the African Union forces in the country. Apparently, they must be in the country for insidious reasons other than sustaining the government and only protect themselves.
In the final analysis, a genuine Somali federal government that shows a willingness to fight a truly national campaign against Al Shabab militants both strategically and militarily will need all the support it can get from the international community to better track down these terrorists, and to cut off both their domestic and foreign sources of financial support. The Somali society itself must decide if it will hide its head in the sand or recognize the existential threat that Al-Shabab poses to the future of normalcy, free from suicide bombers and daily explosions in their midst.
Heikal I. Kenneded
Washington D.C.
[email protected]