Life for the majority of the Somali population since the collapse of the state in 1991 and the disintegration of the country’s political order has been difficult at best. After nearly two decades of warlords’ and faction leaders’ rule Somalia leads the world in infant mortality. Further, despite the absence of high HIV incidence rates in Somalia, life expectancy has declined by as much as those southern African countries devastated by the HIV/AIDs pandemic. The conditions which have produced these deplorable vital statistics are products of the combined effects of internal and external forces. Warlords’ and faction leaders’ domination and an international community least concerned about the blight of the people had the consequence of disabling the local population from organizing in order to create an environment conducive to reconstruction.

Over a dozen warlords dominated reconciliation conferences were held in different locations outside the country but none produced the desired result. The most promising conference was the one organized by the neighboring government of Djibouti in the resort town of Arta. This gathering brought together non-combatants but the major warlords boycotted it since they were not allowed to unilaterally set the terms for reconciliation. The Transitional national Government (TNG), which was formed in Arta, floundered due to the corruption and the incompetence of its leadership and challenges from Ethiopia. Ethiopia, the main regional ally of the warlords, was not happy with developments in Arta and subsequently organized an association of these warlords called Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC). This combination led to TNG’s demise and the convening of yet another Somali reconciliation conference organized by IGAD, held in Embagathi Kenya and which lasted for two years. The Embgathi conference was dominated by the warlords and was fully financed by the European Union and other donors. Sponsors’ rationale for warlords’ predominance in the conference was the belief among them that the merchants of violence were the real actors who should drive the process as their exclusion would derail the peace conference. In addition, the IGAD managers responsible for the negotiation process allowed Ethiopia to gerrymander the conference agenda and proceedings. Consequently, the latter was able to reward its clients by enabling them to form the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Despite the preponderance of misgivings about the legitimacy of the process, the international community blessed the imposition of a government of warlords on the Somali people, and most of the population begrudgingly accepted the TFG as the government of the land with the hope that the warlords would act as responsible national leaders.

Once more the people’s expectation was dashed as the warlords failed to agree to work together for the common good. Immediately after the formation of the government, its two leading figures went to Addis Ababa and requested the deployment of 20,000 foreign troops, including Ethiopian forces in Somalia in order to restore stability and enable the TFG to take control of the country. This strategy was opposed by many MPs and most of the warlords based in Mogadishu. In addition, the Somali President and his Prime Minister appealed to the international community for support but received little help and the process of re-establishing national authority stalled. In the midst of this stalemate, several of the major warlords in Mogadishu formed a new "Anti-terror Alliance" whose purpose was to capture international terrorists fugitives they claimed were sheltered by the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu. This assertion echoed earlier United States government accusation that some of religious people in Mogadishu were harboring three fugitives who are presumed to have participated in the bombing of US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the Israeli owned hotel in the Kenya coast. For several years now the US authorities have subcontracted bounty hunting of "terrorists or radicals" in Somalia to some of the warlords. The warlords exploited the American offer and a number of innocent people have been killed or snatched by the warlords over the last few years. This scheme put every major religious person at risk of being abducted. It seems that the kidnapping operations were not able to capture and deliver key suspects and consequently, in January 2006, six warlords in and around Mogadishu were urged to form a "Counter-terrorists Alliance" with the hope that this association will be more effective. The warlords alleged that the alliance was financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States. It has been widely reported that the CIA provided funds for the warlords to purchase weapons and other materials necessary for war. Members of the alliance repeated the US Government claim that foreign terrorists were hiding in Mogadishu and demanded that the Courts must hand them over or face the consequences. The Courts denied the presence of such foreign individuals in the city and subsequently the warlords declared war on the courts in February 2006. After the first engagement, the public overwhelmingly rallied behind the courts and a bloody war ended the long tenure of the warlords and liberated the population of Mogadishu and the surrounding communities in July 2006. Shortly thereafter, the courts formed the Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC) to coordinate their activities.

The defeat of the fearsome warlords and the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts to power in Mogadishu have alarmed certain circles in the West who have accused them of either being extremists or having ties with terrorists. Originally, the courts have operated in a dozen neighborhoods since the mid-1990s and their duties were confined to dispensing Sharia-based justice in the absence of government institutions. Residents of these communities have consistently indicated that criminal activity was significantly reduced in city areas where the courts functioned while criminals freely roamed elsewhere in Mogadishu.

Several factors have made possible the speedy and unexpected success of the people’s uprising and those of the courts. These included the terror warlords have visited on the population over the last 16 years and the resultant social and economic devastation of the region. Second, the corrupt peace process managed by IGAD and supported by international donors imposed a divisive and fraudulent transitional government of warlords on the Somali people that has alienated the public. Third, the international community that sanctioned the warlords’ government failed to give it the necessary support for it to become functional and this has thoroughly undermined the TFG’s credibility and that of the peace process positioning the Islamic Courts as the alternative leadership. Fourth, the perceived notion that the West, fed by false Ethiopian intelligence, is opposed to Islamic values and is using terrorism as a pretext to sustain the dominance of their client warlords or impose a corrupt and sectarian TFG on the population, has galvanized public support for the courts.

Despite the relative effectiveness of the courts in securing the neighborhoods, it seems that their political ambition was limited to that role until they seized the initiative and took over the capital and the surrounding regions. The dislodgment of the warlords who were opposed to the TFG from the capital immediately situated the UICs on a national platform. Somalia’s president and prime minister, who were at best silent about the struggle between the warlords and the Islamic courts, began to oppose the courts as the latter overpowered their opponents. The turning point in their relationship was the fall of the key town of Jowhar, in the Middle Shabelli region, which was the seat of Mohamed Dheere, the chief ally of the PM and a major recipient of Ethiopian military support. Mr. Geedi, the PM, accused the Courts of looting the property belonging to the defeated warlord and some of the town residents. Independent journalists have contradicted the PM’s claims. Then the President of the TFG, based in Baidoa, added to the PM’s assertions and stipulated that the Courts relinquish their weapons to his sectarian militias. These accusation poisoned relations between the courts and the TFG, and nearly foreclosed dialogue between them. Western Governments who were reluctant to recognize the TFG prior to the emergence of the courts panicked, to use the phrase of the former American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and unconditionally supported the TFG in order to stymie the spread of the UICs to the rest of the country. Such an opportunistic and unconditional assistance for the government reinforced the dictatorial and sectarian predispositions of the leading figures of the TFG. Since then, enough resources have been made available to the leadership to pay off a majority of MPs in order to induce them to endorse the government’s request for the deployment of foreign troops in the country.

The Somali people have been consistently opposed to the deployment of foreign troops that include Ethiopia in their country, and the courts have reiterated this stance particularly now that Mogadishu has been liberated from the warlords’ tyranny. Some Western policy makers, who are weary of anything that smacks of an independent Islamic movement, and swayed by the Ethiopian propaganda, are trying to intimidate the courts in order to empower an illegitimate government of warlords. The threat to deploy foreign troops had the unintended consequences of enhancing the popularity of the Courts and their claim to national leadership while eroding whatever little legitimacy the TFG had. The TFG’s credibility has already been dealt a fatal blow by the fact that contingents of Ethiopian troops have entered Somali territory and occupy several regions of the country, including the President’s residency in Baidoa, and the latter’s opposition to the proposed mediation talks in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum.

The courts were thrust into the national limelight once the warlords were defeated and as the TFG’s ineptitude became increasingly apparent to the population. However, they were ill-prepared for the new role since most of their members had neither the education nor the work experiences to manage or administer national or regional institutions. Furthermore, the defeat of the warlords was so quick and unexpected that the courts had no time to re-organize themselves and mobilize sympathetic others into a national coalition. Members of the courts themselves were a diverse group whose only common denominators were dispensing Sharia-based justice in the neighborhoods and opposition to foreign intervention, particularly Ethiopian and their IGAD allies. The first real challenge that faces the UICs, apart from securing the city and the region, has been how to transform their loose association into cohesive organization with a coherent social and political agenda that can galvanize the population. Their first attempt to do so entailed the formation of their advisory council, the Shura, and its executive committee. The Shura consists of representatives of the various groups who collectively contributed to the ousting of the warlords. Although, the council originally had 73 members, it currently has 94 councilors:

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