Hiiraan Online

Mogadishu (HOL) — Puntland forces backed by U.S. airstrikes are mounting their heaviest offensive yet against Islamic State militants in Puntland, where clashes have killed dozens of soldiers, as Egypt prepares to deploy thousands of troops to Somalia under an African Union mission that threatens to intensify tensions with Ethiopia.

Puntland officials said on August 26 that regional forces, supported by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) aircraft, concluded a two-week campaign against Islamic State Somalia (ISS) strongholds in the al Miskad mountains. AFRICOM said the operation concluded Aug. 23. The operation began on August 22 with a deadly ISS ambush in the Ballade Valley. Local sources reported at least 30 Puntland troops killed and 80 wounded, though officials disputed the figures.

Despite the losses, Puntland forces advanced deeper into the valley, capturing wells and cutting key roads to encircle ISS positions. Fighting escalated on August 27, when militants launched their first suicide counterattack of the campaign. Puntland officials said six attackers were killed, but sniper fire and ambushes claimed another 23 soldiers in three days of clashes.

AFRICOM carried out repeated airstrikes, including one unconfirmed strike on August 23 that may have targeted ISS deputy chief Issa Fahiye. Officials said the campaign aimed at “ISIS leadership,” language suggesting the presence of global figures. ISS leader Abdulqadir Mumin is believed to head the Islamic State’s East Africa office and may also oversee the group’s global directorate, known as al Karrar, which manages funding and recruitment across affiliates worldwide.

The United Nations estimates ISS retains between 600 and 800 fighters, many of them foreign veterans from the Middle East. Puntland’s 2025 offensive has killed nearly 200 fighters and captured 150, but senior leaders remain at large. U.N. reporting in July noted that ISS continues to serve as a key administrative and financial hub for the Islamic State due to its hosting of the al Karrar office. U.S. forces in late July captured the group’s finance chief, who was responsible for foreign fighter logistics and global transfers, but other high-value figures remain in the mountains.

Commanders say militants are defending themselves from fortified caves and tunnel networks that are resistant to airstrikes and difficult to clear. The defenses resemble the Islamic State’s last stands in Mosul, Raqqa, and Sirte, where fighters relied on snipers, suicide bombers, and improvised explosives to inflict heavy casualties.

Puntland authorities blocked major roads to the valley and gave militants 72 hours to surrender on August 25. Social media reports, which remain unverified, claimed that U.S. and Puntland officials paused some airstrikes after concerns about women and children in the area.

In a parallel development, the African Union on August 26 approved Egypt’s participation in the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Planning documents indicate about 1,091 Egyptian troops in the near term, with police contingents also slated for Mogadishu and regional hubs. Cairo has pledged up to 10,000 troops to replace Ethiopian forces, with the first units expected to deploy to Gedo, Hiraan, and Lower Shabelle regions.

The deployment risks inflaming Egypt’s long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile. Egypt has long described the dam as an existential threat to its water security. The Nile provides about 90 percent of Egypt’s water, while Ethiopia insists the project is essential to meet its growing energy needs. Both governments have traded threats over the issue, and Ethiopian officials have repeatedly warned against Egyptian deployments in Somalia.

Egypt’s planned sectors overlap areas already patrolled by Ethiopian troops under AU and bilateral arrangements. Ethiopia also maintains forces in Gedo to support its ally, Jubbaland state, and seized several airports in the region in 2024 to deny Somali federal or Egyptian access.

The Egyptian deployment could deepen Somalia’s internal disputes. Federal government forces clashed with Jubbaland troops in July, seizing control of the border town of Beled Hawo. Jubbaland leaders vowed to retake the town, while Somali media reported that the federal government planned to install its own administration there. Unconfirmed reports on social media suggested Egypt may build a base in the area. Ethiopia, which has historically backed Jubbaland as a proxy to pressure Mogadishu, has demanded federal troops withdraw, warning of further escalation.

The latest geopolitical flare-up in the Horn of Africa can be traced back to Ethiopia’s January 2024 deal with Somaliland, a pact that promised Addis Ababa access to Berbera port in return for the possible recognition of Somaliland’s independence. Mogadishu denounced the deal as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and threatened to expel Ethiopian forces, triggering one of the most serious rifts between the two countries in recent years. 

The dispute spilled into the international arena, with Somalia recalling its ambassador and lobbying regional and global partners to oppose Ethiopia’s move. Turkey stepped in as mediator late in 2024, and in December, the Ankara Declaration temporarily eased hostilities by restoring diplomatic relations and committing both sides to dialogue over Ethiopia’s maritime access needs.

The Ankara truce briefly lifted expectations, but the momentum soon ebbed away. When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed sat down with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in February 2025, both men pledged to honour the spirit of reconciliation. Technical teams were dispatched to Ankara in the following weeks, tasked with hammering out the thorny details of Ethiopia’s quest for sea access. Yet even in those early sessions, the limits of compromise began to show.By April, they had stalled. By July, reports suggested the process had collapsed altogether. Despite Ethiopia appointing a new envoy to Mogadishu in August, no substantive meetings have taken place.

The collapse of the Ankara process lays bare the deep mistrust between the two governments, and rekindles fears that Addis Ababa may again turn to Somaliland for bilateral deals, while Mogadishu seeks greater backing from Turkey and Egypt to contain its powerful neighbour.

These developments are part of a deeper geopolitical rotation: Egypt and Eritrea have moved from tacit understanding to overt alignment with Somalia, united in their concern over Ethiopia’s push for maritime access and regional dominance. The formation of their tripartite bloc in October 2024 crystallized this shift, offering Mogadishu both strategic backing and a diplomatic lifeline. As of mid-2025, statements indicate a renewed solidarity.