Friday October 25, 2024
FILE - Minister Abiy Ahmed on April 8, 2023, during the graduation ceremony of recruits at the Ethiopian military academy.
Mogadishu (HOL) — Ethiopia’s strategic bid for a Red Sea foothold is intensifying regional tensions across the Horn of Africa, sparking a tug-of-war among Ethiopia, Djibouti, Egypt, and Somalia that could alter the region’s political landscape.
Control of the Red Sea is at the heart of this regional power struggle.
Central to this escalating conflict is Ethiopia’s port deal with Somaliland—a potential lifeline for the embattled landlocked nation that could reduce its economic dependency on Djibouti, where almost all of Ethiopia’s maritime trade flows. As Ethiopia pivots toward Somaliland, it risks unravelling its long-standing economic ties with Djibouti and provoking opposition from Somalia and Egypt.
The deal, signed in January, grants Ethiopia significant access to Somaliland’s port infrastructure in exchange for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence—a move Addis Ababa has branded a “natural right.” Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has emphasized the existential importance of maritime access for his country, even suggesting that Ethiopia would use force to defend this access if necessary.
However, the deal comes at a cost. Somalia, which views Somaliland as part of its sovereign territory, has condemned the agreement as illegal, igniting a diplomatic firestorm. The Somali Federal Government quickly moved to bolster its alliances with Egypt and Eritrea, positioning itself as a bulwark against Ethiopia’s growing ambitions.
In response to Ethiopia’s deal, Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized an anti-Ethiopian tripartite alliance during a summit in Asmara, Eritrea, in October 2024. The three nations agreed to coordinate military and diplomatic efforts to counter Ethiopia’s influence and safeguard Somalia’s territorial integrity.
For Egypt, this alliance is not only about Somalia—it’s about maintaining dominance over the Red Sea, a critical waterway for global trade and the Suez Canal’s lifeblood.
Egypt has long viewed Ethiopia as a regional rival, particularly after the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt fears will limit its control over Nile waters. Ethiopia’s ambitions to establish a naval presence in the Red Sea add another layer to this rivalry, threatening Egypt’s strategic interests in the region.
Somalia’s response to Ethiopia’s growing power has been both diplomatic and military. In August 2024, Somalia signed a bilateral defence pact with Egypt, accelerating its military buildup. Egyptian troops have since arrived in Mogadishu, and multiple arms shipments—including anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry—have bolstered Somalia’s defence capabilities. While these arms are ostensibly meant for the fight against al-Shabaab, their heavy nature suggests that they are also intended for broader military confrontations.
Leaders of Somalia, Egypt, and Eritrea strengthen their anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit in Asmara, Eritrea, on October 10, 2024. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (left), Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (center), and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (right) reaffirmed their cooperation on regional security and maritime access. The Red Sea, central to their discussions, is visible in the background, symbolizing the geopolitical stakes. Credit: Illustration by HOL
In September, Somalia raised the stakes further when its foreign minister threatened to support Ethiopian insurgent groups if Addis Ababa proceeded with its Somaliland port deal.
Complicating Ethiopia’s external ambitions is its internal fragility. The country is still reeling from the aftermath of the Tigray war, which ended with a tenuous peace in 2022 but left Ethiopia internally divided. Insurgent groups in Oromia and Tigray continue to challenge the central government, stretching Ethiopia’s military thin and limiting its capacity to project power externally.
Eritrea, which shares a contentious border with Ethiopia and played a key role in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, remains suspicious of Addis Ababa’s intentions and sees Ethiopia’s port deal as a direct challenge to its control of the Red Sea coastline.
Eritrean troops continue to occupy parts of Ethiopia, a sign of lingering mistrust between the two nations.
Analysts say these internal divisions will influence Ethiopia’s ability to respond effectively to the growing anti-Ethiopian alliance.
Djibouti, concerned about losing Ethiopia’s lucrative transit fees that constitute a critical component of its economy, has countered by offering Ethiopia a new northern port. Yet tensions remain, as Djibouti contemplates its options in light of Ethiopia’s assertiveness and increasing alignment with Egypt.
To mitigate these threats, Egypt has steadily built influence in the Horn, most recently cementing an alliance with Djibouti. On October 14, Egypt signed a contract to construct a solar power plant in Djibouti, a strategic step toward reducing Djibouti’s reliance on Ethiopian electricity. Egypt has simultaneously bolstered ties with Somalia, aiming to secure a role in the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
The African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia, set to end in December 2024, has become another battleground in the regional power struggle. In a bold diplomatic shift, Somalia has backed Egypt’s involvement in AUSSOM, opposing Ethiopian troops’ presence in the mission. Somalia’s Foreign Ministry, reiterating the nation’s sovereignty over its peacekeeping alliances, has declared that Ethiopian forces are no longer welcome—a position spurred mainly by Ethiopia’s Somaliland deal. This move would likely further diminish Ethiopia’s influence in Somalia and solidify Egypt’s military presence in the Horn.
Ethiopia, however, remains steadfast, asserting its right to maintain a security buffer against al-Shabaab within Somalia’s borders. Ethiopian officials have even suggested they may continue to station troops in Somalia if there is enough regional support, regardless of Somalia’s stance.
The impending AUSSOM troop deployment deadline on November 15 has revealed fractures within the African Union’s troop-contributing countries. Uganda’s foreign minister recently raised concerns that Egypt’s entry could destabilize the mission’s cohesion, especially as the current structure has relied on established cooperation among regional neighbours. The United States has appeared to offer implicit support for Ethiopia’s continued involvement, emphasizing the vital role Ethiopia and neighbouring nations have played in countering al-Shabaab’s influence.
As Ethiopia’s port deal with Somaliland pushes the Horn of Africa toward greater instability, the region stands at a critical crossroads. The growing anti-Ethiopian alliance, combined with Ethiopia’s internal vulnerabilities, suggests that the coming months will be decisive in determining the future balance of power in the Horn.