Monday April 1, 2019
By Stig Jarle Hansen
A soldier walks amid the damage after an attack by gunmen on Fulani herders in Ogossagou, Mali March 25, 2019.
Mali’s Mopti region has seen a drastic rise of violence since 2015. Last year at least 202 civilians were killed in 42 incidents. In March this year more than 150 were killed in attacks against two villages in this central Malian region.
The attack on the Mopti region was launched by alleged Dogon hunters. The Dogon are one of the largest ethnic groups in the region.Most of those killed in Mopti were from the Fulani ethnic group. Also among the targets
were staff involved in demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of
local “self-defence groups” stationed in one of the villages.
Mali’s Mopti region has seen a drastic rise of violence since 2015. Last year at least 202 civilians were killed in 42 incidents. In March this year more than 150 were killed in attacks against two villages in this central Malian region.
The attack on the Mopti region was launched by alleged Dogon hunters. The Dogon are one of the largest ethnic groups in the region.
Most of those killed in Mopti were from the Fulani ethnic group. Also among the targets
were staff involved in demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of
local “self-defence groups” stationed in one of the villages.
Land disputes within communities are also
fuelling conflict. This can be seen in the light of the weakening of
traditional mediation structures that is less and less successful in
ending such conflicts. And the influx of small arms from the 1990s and
onwards has made land conflicts more deadly, leading to a cycle of
retribution between ethnic groups.
To make
matters worse, the central government is either unwilling or unable to
punish communal violence. The central Malian government previously used
local militias as agents when unable or unwilling to provide local
security. This has contributed to local insecurity and led to distrust
between locals and the government. In this setting local militias are
easily tempted to bring in new allies – including jihadists.
Government
delegation of power to local militias, combined with communities in
need of allies in local conflicts and the absence of local security,
present opportunities for jihadists to enter a new area and gain
success, finances and recruits.
The setting
also creates difficulties for international actors trying to stem their
influence. The West, for instance, almost never engages in local
reconciliation and rural security. It focuses mostly on the destruction
of jihadist affiliated militias.
As I argue in my new book,
dynamics like these are similar to those in other areas in Africa that
have provided fertile breeding grounds for jihadists in the past.
The Fulani and jihadists
The
Fulani started joining the jihadists when they gained control of the
north of Mali in 2012 and 2013. For example, nomadic Fulani from the
Douentza region joined Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
training camps in Gao. Others joined Ansar Dine. But many returned to
Mopti from Northern Mali when the jihadists lost territorial control.
Today,
the Dogon and Bambara routinely accuse the Fulani of allying with the
Makina Liberation Front, also known as the Katiba Macina, which forms
part of the wider al Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam
wa-l-Muslimin.
On
the other hand, Fulanis claim they are stereotyped by their enemies as
jihadists. But it’s important to note that the Macina Liberation Front,
led by the charismatic Amadu Koufa, routinely uses pro-Fulani rhetoric.
Koufa also refers to a Fulani golden age, and a reestablishment of the
historic Macina caliphate. He also recently reemerged in a jihadist video mocking France and Mali for claiming he was dead.
Further
north, outside Mopti in the Menaka region, the Islamic State in greater
Sahara has also injected itself in local conflicts supporting Fulani
sub-tribes. Islamic State forces in Menaka, engage in cattle rustling
and cattle “protection” for locals. Further south this element is also
there in Ibrahim Dicko, the leader of the Burkina Faso-based Ansarul
Islam. He similarly plays on the Fulani’s grievances against the central
government.
This picture is further complicated by conflicts among the Fulani and by the Islamic State at times choosing allies who are rivals of the Fulani.
Downward spiral
For
the locals in Mopti, the jihadists are very real. Not all of them are
from Macina and some sign their attacks in the name of other jihadist
partners. Many attacks have no groups taking responsibility for them.
The
labels are fluid and the borders between jihadism and self-defence are
blurred. Ethnic groups often provide recruits to many different armed
groups. These groups actively undermine the state’s already weak justice
system, and the increased insecurity hinders both business, general
travel and farming.
This contributes to the downward spiral by increasing the impact of the root causes of Mopti’s problems.
Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life Sciences
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.