KDF operations call for change of tack

Tuesday February 23, 2016

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Firstly, our current mission and mandate under AMISOM is irrelevant to the reason that took us to Somalia. The positional defence posture we have adopted in Somalia is both inappropriate and incapable of defeating the enemy. Secondly, the enemy we were facing five years ago has mutated in terms of methods and doctrine.

There has also been an increase in cross-movement of troops, weaponry and tactics between terrorist theatres of war in other parts of the world. In order to resolve the problem therefore, KDF must adopt a ‘Home security’ paradigm, in which deployment will be both mobile and aggressive.

They must also utilise our own assets for intelligence, air and sea cover, as well as technology for intelligence and precision targeting.

When KDF entered Somalia in October 2011, they had a singular focus; that of degrading the Al-shabaab terrorist group. Besides numerous terror attacks at home, the group was also actively involved in pirating in the Indian Ocean.

Worse still, there was an aggressive recruitment and radicalisation of hundreds of Kenyan youths into the Al-Shabaab.

Kenya therefore did the right thing; sending troops to Somalia to degrade the enemy, cut off the source of funding and stop recruitment and radicalisation of Kenyan youth. The operation was a success acknowledged worldwide.

Within six months, we had pacified Jubaland, captured the strategic port of Kismayu and stemmed piracy in the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, we began the work of reconstruction and stabilisation through the training of a new Somali National Army, the training and deployment of administrators as well as giving humanitarian support to the population.

Cross-border business resumed and normalcy returned in Jubaland. The international community took this chance to deploy a peace-keeping mission under the African Union.

The deployment of AMISON and the re-hatting of KDF as part of AMISON changed the mission. It should be noted that AMISON entered the theatre as a peace-keeping mission. Peace keepers aim to maintain tranquility after a ceasefire. Consequently, peace-keeping troops are normally stationed in populated areas in order to reassure and protect the population.

When KDF crossed over to AMISON, our troops were deployed away from our areas of interest. We lost the freedom to choose and pursue targets of our interest. More importantly, we lost the use of key assets such as intelligence, air and sea cover. Our troops were not only vulnerable but also incapable of protecting us.
The second factor that has changed is Al Shabaab terror group.

At the time we entered Somalia, we were dealing largely with a collection of untrained militias, who were inspired by local grievances and were borrowing their methods from Al Qaida. Al Shabaab has changed methods and aims in order to mimic and gain recognition and support from the new terror outfits.

Judging from the attacks in the last one year, they have been attempting to capture and establish a ‘Caliphate’. Its most daring attempts were Mpeketoni, Mandera and Garissa. It is now evident to security observers that Kenya must change, or change will inevitably catch up with us in our slumber.

The first change is to stop thinking in terms of ‘Peace Mission’ to ‘Home Security’ mission. The cardinal role of any military is to secure national security interest. This is true irrespective of which hat we are wearing. We must thus rethink our grand strategy, war strategy as well as the battle tactics.

This calls for redeploying of troops, aggressive mobile defence and use of intelligence, sea and air cover. We must deploy close to the border. More importantly, we must ‘deploy’ the Kenya population in support of war.
The politicians and diplomats have performed poorly in this war.

War diplomacy and war politics are critical to success. After all war is diplomacy by other means. And nations go to war in order to talk. Finally, KDF must use technology, and in particular, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).

Inasmuch as the KDF has effectively used these assets for limited border surveillance, we need to step up to acquire the latest weaponised “drones” with night capabilities. This is the way forward for future wars. For example, America, by use of this technology, has eliminated more than 500 terror commanders in the last one year.

At a time when Amazon is planning to use UVAs to deliver packages to the doorsteps of her clients, we cannot argue that UVA technology is too advanced for us. In conclusion “The Music is on”.
We either retake the initiative or future generations will judge us harshly for dropping the ball, in our time.

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