A sign showing K Street is shown 01 February 2006 in Washington, D.C.
A stone's throw from the White House, K Street is an alternative
corridor of power in U.S. politics, packed with thick carpeted offices
and lobbyists with even deeper pockets. (KAREN BLEIER/AFP/Getty Images)
Wednesday, July 31, 2013
As gunshots rang out in the background, then-Prime Minister of
Somalia Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed called his man in the United States.
It was 2011, and fighting around Mohamed’s fortified location in
Mogadishu was commonplace. John Zagame had grown used to hearing
gunshots and mortar fire during his daily phone conversations with the
premier. They discussed the state of play in Mogadishu and how best to
approach key leaders in the Obama administration and Congress for help.
But Zagame did not work for an embassy, nor was he a diplomat.
Rather, Zagame was a vice president at Park Strategies LLC – a
Washington, D.C.-based lobbying firm run by the former Republican
Senator from New York, Alfonse D’Amato.
“The prime minister needed representation here and someone to carry
his message,” Zagame said. “So that’s where we came in. He needed
expressions of support from the U.S. and the U.N. at the highest level.”
Call it ambassadorial outsourcing. African nations, eager to play the
Washington game of being heard in the right places, spend millions on
Washington lobbyists to burnish their images and find favor with U.S.
policy makers.
With Congress in perpetual stalemate and partisanship worse than ever in
Washington, navigating the world of the Obama administration, federal
agencies and Capitol Hill is difficult even for the most seasoned
professionals. These nations – some of the poorest on the planet – are
lining up top D.C. lobbying names and signing contracts that can reach
to the seven figures.
Need a direct flight from your capital to the U.S.? Want improved
trade relations, or your new government recognized by the American
government? Does your president want to score tickets to an elite
conference to rub elbows with the powerful? African leaders have turned
to K Street lobbying shops for these and other services. And should
they find themselves in a dicey situation tainted by accusations of
corruption, help from American masters of public relations is only a
phone call away.
African nations both large and small are jumping into the game, and
paying hefty sums to do it. (Somalia’s 2011 contract with Park
Strategies was $240,000.) A 100Reporters review of federal lobbying
records and interviews shows for example:
- Somaliland and Puntland, autonomous regions in
Somalia, hired their own lobbyists. Puntland hired the Moffett Group – a
Washington firm run by former Connecticut Congressman Toby Moffett – to
help get ConocoPhillips to reinvest in its oil exploration leases.
Somaliland hired the Glover Park Group – run by former Clinton
administration officials Carter Eskew, Joe Lockhart and Michael Feldman –
and in March signed a new contract worth 22,500 per month.
- Last summer, Nigeria agreed to pay the Glover Park
Group30,000 a month, plus expenses. Documents show Nigeria was
particularly concerned with U.S. policies related to security
cooperation between the two countries.
- Madagascar hired the U.S. Fed Group to arrange a series of
meetings for its transitional president President H.E. Rajoelina in key
American states – and an invitation to the Clinton Global Initiative
(CGI) conference in June 2012. Records show U.S. Fed paid Quintairos,
Preito, Wood and Boyer in Chicago75,000 to score the invitation and an
appearance with Bill Clinton and meetings with the mayor of Chicago,
governor of Illinois and other officials.
- Mauritius paid the Washington firm Ryberg & Smith
LLP600,000 from 2003 to 2011. This year, federal records show, it is
paying Mercury LLC a20,000-a-month to advance issues related to its
“sovereignty.” (Mauritius claims sovereignty over the Chagos islands,
where the key American military base on Diego Garcia is located).
- Kenya paid Chlopak, Leonard, Schechter and Associates2.4
million in 2008, followed by roughly another2 million in 2009, to lobby
policymakers and burnish the country’s reputation among business leaders
in Washington, New York and other cities. In 2010, the Kenyan
government entered an agreement with both Chlopak and the Moffett Group
for advocacy and communication services.
- South Sudan hired the firm Independent Diplomat
when it seceded from the north in 2011, to help the new country secure
diplomatic recognition as an independent state.
Like South Sudan, the former Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia hired the Moffett Group in the absence of an embassy to press
its case in Washington. Following the long-awaited normalization of
relations between Washington and Mogadishu in January, Somalia’s Central
Bank asked Moffett to help its effort to renegotiate its foreign debt,
rebuild its financial system and forge relationships with other central
banks. (The bank also sought stolen government funds that it believed
were frozen by U.S. authorities – but Moffett discovered no such
seizures.)
Meanwhile, big African nations – Kenya for instance – have hired
lobbyists who augment – and sometimes clash – with their existing
embassy staff.
The Whitaker Group worked to engineer a turnaround in Uganda’s
troubled image, assisted by a former top official for African affairs
from both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Rwanda, Tanzania and
others have all paid for representation from K Street insiders.
THE UN-DIPLOMATS
Lobbyists say they can aid these countries by sidestepping the
delicate world of diplomatic language and embassy protocol to get right
to key Washington decision makers.
But nations can present distinct challenges as a client. Lobbyists
hired to help improve their images occasionally have to worry about
their own reputations as well.
Some lobbyists and public relations shops have cancelled contracts
amid criticism of their roles, particularly when their clients cracked
down on critics or flouted international norms too blatantly. Lobbying
agreements with Egypt, Uganda and Rwanda have all collapsed when events
in those countries took a downward turn.
But for every firm that steps aside, there is another that rises up to reap huge fees, regardless of the notoriety at stake.
Washington, D.C.-based Qorvis Communications has polished the image
of the tiny West African nation of Equatorial Guinea – whose vast oil
wealth goes to finance outlandish luxury for its ruling family, the
Obiangs, while 76.8 percent of its people live below the poverty level
according to World Bank figures. (American and French authorities have
seized numerous assets of the Obiangs, including a $180 million French
mansion, 11 luxury cars, $50 million worth of furniture and a $2 million
wine collection.)
Qorvis has raked in nearly $70,000 a month to lead the charge in
obscuring the regime’s record. Qorvis, which also represents the
government of Bahrain and drew heat for defending that country’s violent
crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in 2011, has worked to legitimize
the ruling family.
Qorvis employs an aggressive media strategy of pitching favorable
stories to American media outlets—though Matt J. Lauer, who oversees its
global brand, did not respond to interview requests for this story.
Qorvis issues a steady stream of press releases touting Equatorial
Guinea as a wonderful place – a strategy partially aimed at manipulating
search engines such as Google, so that news stories that are generally
unfavorable get pushed further down its search results in favor of
flattering portrayals by Qorvis.
With Qorvis’s help, Equatorial Guinea even managed to snag the honor
of co-hosting the Africa Cup of Nations, the continent’s prestigious
bi-annual soccer tournament.
The Obiangs also turned to Lanny Davis, a former Clinton Administration official who now runs his own Washington lobbying shop.
Davis told 100Reporters that he initially rebuffed EG’s overtures in
2009, but agreed to help roll out democratic reforms in the troubled
nation. His fee: $1 million annually, plus expenses, over two years.
“I took the representation on because I thought they were doing bad
things, and I was hired to make them do good things,” he said. Davis,
whose role drew outspoken criticism from human rights groups and other
organizations, said he was unfairly targeted as “defending a dictator.”
“These countries are pleading to be in the United States’ good
graces. And my answer was, ‘It’s never going to happen unless you treat
your people right, you have transparency, due process, a judiciary, a
free press,’” he said. “You can spend all the money you want on the P.R.
agencies of the world to write your press releases. It will never
happen. Because you cannot fool anyone, you have to change facts on the
ground.”
Davis cited a speech that Obiang gave laying out a path toward
political and economic freedoms. The speech – which Davis wrote – was
well received at the time and praised by Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
But Obiang’s words never translated into action: today Equatorial
Guinea’s citizens face the same hardships, poverty and political
repression they always have – while the Obiang family itself remains one
of the wealthiest in Africa.
“The program was not implemented,” Davis said.
According to Davis, the reforms were not the only thing that didn’t
materialize: neither did the six-figure reimbursements for travel
expenses his firm racked up during four extended trips to Africa. The
firm parted ways with Equatorial Guinea after only a year and Davis is
now suing in federal court to recover the payments he says his firm is
owed.
Citing the pending litigation, Davis declined to say whether he thought the Obiangs ever intended to follow through on reforms.
FILLING A GAP?
Federal records show that in recent years, numerous African
governments have been inking such deals – from the ones previously
mentioned to others including Gabon, Cameroon, Mali and even tiny
Gambia.
Toby Moffett said that “over the last decade or so there’s been a big
up-tick in the number of countries that have hired companies here.”
Moffett said developing countries in Africa lack established embassy
operations and diplomatic finesse, and frequently need help to get
access to key policymakers. Sometimes they need lobbyists to lead their
entire effort in Washington. Larger nations, meanwhile, seek extra help
in achieving specific objectives, or to press their cases in ways that
an embassy staffer, or even ambassador, would shy away from attempting.
“There is a certain value that comes when you have Americans talking
to Americans, and that comes with having unfiltered, undiplomatic
communication,” Moffett said. “We can say things to members of the
administration or Congress that an ambassador just couldn’t do.”
Kenya, an important regional power in Africa, has a Washington
embassy staffed by several dozen nationals and a multi-million dollar
budget. Nevertheless, Kenya turned to U.S. lobbying and public relations
firms for damage control after tribal violence engulfed the country,
following charges of vote rigging in the 2007 election by President Mwai
Kibaki.
Eager to press its case in Washington – ranging from trade issues to
direct flights to Nairobi – the Kenyan government hired the Chlopak,
Leonard and later the Moffett Group, as well.
Though favored back in Nairobi, the outsourcing led to friction with
Kenya’s former ambassador in Washington, who questioned the need for
U.S. firms to do work traditionally under the embassy’s charge.
The ambassador, Rateng Ogego, opposed continuing the original
contract when it came up for renewal. His successor, Elkanah Odembo,
followed suit and also raised objections to hiring American firms.
Both men were overruled by officials back in Nairobi.
“If the main purpose of the contract is to have CLS [Chlopak,
Leonard] engage in public advocacy on behalf of Kenya, what is the role
of the embassy’s 35 staff at the annual cost of $3,024,803?” Odembo
said. American policymakers, the ambassador added, don’t need U.S.
companies to tell them what’s happening back in Kenya, and are unlikely
to be swayed by “a charm offensive.”
Former Kenyan trade minister Mukhisa Kite said such lobby contracts
are not necessary, and could be a vehicle for corruption. The country
should represent itself.
“I believe some people within government are benefiting from this
deal and not necessarily the Kenyan people,” said Kituyi, in an
interview prior to his appointment as Secretary-General of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Moffett argues it can be less expensive to outsource work to a U.S.
lobbying firm than pay the costs associated with hiring eight or 10
full-time embassy employees, and that his clients keep a close eye on
the bottom line. “I don’t have any question that major value is being
brought that they wouldn’t otherwise have,” he said. “We’re under
constant pressure to show results and progress – if that doesn’t happen,
then they will say goodbye.”
He said his firm and the Kenyan embassy generally split the
Washington political turf. The Kenyans focus on the State Department
and executive branch. His lobbying firm, by contrast, concentrates
mainly on Congress.
“I can go to a dozen members of Congress and their staffs on an
issue,” Moffett said. “An ambassador can be very talented, but if I’m
with House members and their staffs and I tell them, ‘Look, you really
need to focus on this, it’s important’ – they’re going to pay attention
in a different way.”
CUTTING BAIT
Not all of these engagements have a happy ending. In some cases, the
lobbying efforts simply do not pay off. That is not an entirely
unusual outcome for advocacy work – especially in an increasingly
fractured Washington.
Trickier yet is the dilemma faced by firms dealing with unstable and
corrupt regimes. Events on the ground can suddenly shift in unexpected
ways.
Both of those factors came into play when then-Prime Minister
Mohamed, of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, most needed a
show of American support.
Mohamed, also known by the nickname “Farmaajo,” came to power through
an unorthodox path. He applied for asylum in the United States in 1988,
after publicly criticizing the Somali government while representing its
interests in the U.S. Mohamed went on to graduate from the State
University of New York at Buffalo and found himself in public service
once again – this time for the local housing authority in Buffalo, N.Y.
He later wound up working for the New York Department of
Transportation, and taught conflict resolution at a local community
college.
Yet in late 2010, a political vacuum in Somalia drew him back to his
native country. The Somali president tapped him to be prime minister, in
an attempt to unite disparate political factions. (The transitional
government, formed in 2004, was still largely dysfunctional, and a
scathing U.N. report would later conclude that in 2009 and 2010, nearly
70 percent of the money it received wound up being embezzled.)
Somalia’s lobbying contract with Park Strategies came about through
another twist of fate. Joel Giambra – a former city official Mohamed
knew in Buffalo, had recently gone to work for Park Strategies. Mohamed
called him for advice on reaching American officials in Washington.
The lobbying shop, which had never before taken on a country as a
client, found itself acting as the de facto diplomatic mission for
Mohamed and his government.
“You can’t say you’re an embassy, because you don’t have diplomatic
credentials and can’t go in an official capacity,” said Zagame, Park
Strategies’ vice president involved in the effort. “But we basically did
the things an embassy should do.”
This included representing Somalia and explaining its shifting
political landscape to members of Congress and State Department
officials, as well as organizing meetings for Mohamed with policymakers.
Before long, the prime minister faced a crisis. And so did Park Strategies.
The speaker of the Somali parliament became locked in a power
struggle with the transitional government’s president – and to protect
his own turf, each man began orchestrating a back-room deal that left
Mohamed out in the cold. They announced an agreement to form Somalia’s
first non-“transitional” parliament in nearly a decade. But the speaker
had a condition: Mohamed had to go.
Park Strategies rushed to Congressional leaders and the Obama administration, seeking help. But none came.
“Sadly, that didn’t happen, and he was essentially sacrificed on an altar of political expediency,” Zagame said.
Though the news of Mohamed’s ouster ignited protests in Somalia, he
chose not to dig in and fight. Instead, Mohamed left the country and
returned to the United States in the summer of 2011 – back to Buffalo.
Back to work in his cubicle at the New York Department of
Transportation.
At that point, the lobbying shop had a decision to make: Would it
continue to represent the Somali government which had just rebuffed its
reformist prime minister and was riddled with corruption? Or would it
give up a potentially lucrative contract?
“We eventually told the new prime minister that we were withdrawing
our representation,” Zagame said. “We’d gotten involved because of
Mohamed and what we felt he was trying to accomplish. When things took a
different direction, we just weren’t comfortable being advocates for
that government anymore.”
A spokesman for Abdi Farah Shirdon, Somalia’s current prime minister,
declined to comment on the events surrounding Mohamed and Park
Strategies. But he told 100Reporters the new, non-transitional
government currently has no agreements with U.S. lobbying firms.
“Since we normalized our relations with Washington our diplomats play
the lead role,” said spokesman Ahmed Adan, saying he didn’t think “a
lobbying firm can be the diplomatic face of Somalia.”
However, when asked about the Central Bank’s current contract with
The Moffett Group, Adan declined to explain the distinction or clarify
his statements. (The bank operates as an independent entity in Somalia,
though the prime minister is aware of the Americans’ involvement and has
even participated in some phone calls, according to Moffett
Somalia was not an isolated instance, as instability and regime
changes in Africa can put U.S. firms in a quandary. The monetary value
of a contract can suddenly be at odds with the reputational damage it
can bring.
The Whitaker Group was credited with promoting investments in
Uganda’s cotton industry and boosting trade by helping global giant
Starbucks purchase Ugandan coffee. But in 2009, President Yoweri
Museveni’s government continued its suppression of political opponents
and gays. Museveni then maneuvered to change the constitution to allow
him cling to power. The firm broke off its relationship. (A spokeswoman
for Whitaker did not return phone calls from 100Reporters.)
The fast-moving and unstable events in Egypt after the 2011
revolution presented similar challenges for firms seeking to represent
the government there.
Shortly after Egypt’s popular uprising riveted the world – as it once
again is doing now – the ruling military council that followed ousted
president Hosni Mubarak hired three Washington lobbying firms at a
combined cost of roughly $90,000 per month.
The Moffett Group was among them, as were the Podesta Group and the
Livingston Group – run by former Louisiana Congressman Bob Livingston,
who had been chairman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee in
the 1990s but was forced to resign after a scandal.
But when Egyptian authorities started raiding non-governmental
organizations and jailing their workers, Americans among them, the
uproar was swift and inescapable. Condemnations from around the U.S.
and the world grew.
Adding fuel to the fire: one of the Americans detained was Sam
LaHood, son of then-U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. He was
arrested at the airport trying to leave the country.
Members of Congress called for cutting off aid to Egypt, and Cairo
frantically turned to their new hired guns in D.C. for help – claiming
the NGOs didn’t have proper permits to operate in the country.
Initially, the firms tried to pass that argument on to U.S. officials.
But if their goal was to lower the political temperature, the effort
backfired.
The Livingston Group even drew up talking points for defending the
Egyptian generals. The talking points subsequently hit the press and
heightened the condemnation of Egypt’s old guard military council and
its hired guns on K Street. The contracts became untenable.
Moffett said he told Egyptian authorities he needed reasonable
concessions to take to worried American officials – which would mean
ceasing the military’s crackdown on human rights workers and releasing
those it had detained. There could be ways to do it while saving face,
but it had to be done, Moffett said he told them.
“They couldn’t give us anything to talk about on the Hill or the
White House on rounding up these NGO workers,” Moffett said. “They said
‘Well these are our laws.’ I said, ‘We understand sovereignty, but
you’re not going to get away with busting in to American groups, taking
cash, putting people in a closet, detaining them.’”
Moffett said he gave up after his clients in Cairo refused to even
expedite a review of the criminal cases against the American and other
human rights workers in custody. The firm cancelled its contract with
Egypt in early 2012.
“We just couldn’t defend them anymore,” he said.
Egypt would eventually blink on the NGO workers. And more than a
month after he was detained, Sam LaHood was allowed to leave the country
and return to the United States.
A spokeswoman for the Livingston Group declined to comment on its
involvement with Egypt. But she said the firm no longer represents the
country.
Davis, who represented Equatorial Guinea, may also hold the record
for the shortest tenure of any lobbying firm’s involvement with an
African nation.
In late 2010, Davis signed a $100,000-a-month contract to represent
the Ivory Coast when its former president, military strongman Laurent
Gbagbo, stayed on after losing an election. Ten days later, however,
Davis quit.
Davis faced blistering criticism from human rights groups, but he
said critics misunderstood his mission: to secretly facilitate Gbagbo’s
peaceful departure in conjunction with the country’s ambassador and the
U.S. State Department.
“The whole thing was supposed to be behind the scenes to get him
out,” Davis said. The contract, he added, was essentially a cover to set
up a backchannel way of getting Gbagbo on the phone with President
Barack Obama. There was just one problem: Gbagbo wouldn’t take Obama’s
call.
While Davis defended his involvement with Equatorial Guinea, he told
100Reporters that he regrets the Ivory Coast affair – calling it an
“immense mistake” and that he should have been transparent about his
role.
“I don’t think I’ll ever do this again,” he said.
Aaron Kessler reported from Washington and Wanjohi Kabukuru reported from Nairobi Kenya.