Strategy Page
Saturday, December 14, 2013
As al Shabaab is cleared from
more parts of Somalia more information is getting out about how the
Islamic terrorists operated when they controlled most of southern
Somalia after 2009. As long suspected, al Shabaab financed its
operations by “taxing” everyone, including the aid agencies that were
trying to deal with a major famine. Al Shabaab kept raising the taxes
and gradually the businesses and aid agencies left. This helped make the
al Shabaab collapse in 2012 possible.
In northern Kenya, on the Ethiopian border, tribal fighting
has caused several hundred casualties in the last week, with up to a
hundred dead. All those involved are semi-nomadic herders who have
feuded with each other for generations over access to grazing land and
water. In the last two decades many have acquired cheap Cold War surplus
weapons and the feuds have gotten bloodier. Efforts to disarm these
tribes have not been very successful. The recent fighting pitted the
traditional dominant tribe, the Borana, against the Rendille, Gabra and
Burji. Kenya sent more troops to the area to separate the combatants and
try to calm things down. The Borana have long been politically active
and are currently backers of the ruling party in Kenya. Other tribes
accuse the police and army of favoring the Borana, which does happen but
often because the security forces trust the Borana more than the other
tribes because of the political reliability of the Borana.
The latest international corruption rankings put Somalia,
Afghanistan and North Korea at the bottom of the list, as the most
corrupt countries on the planet. In Somalia the corruption is encouraged
by the intense clan loyalties and the desire of high level officials to
look out for their family and clan first and Somalia later, maybe. The
inability of government officials to leave clan politics out of their
decision making and halt the theft of government funds (nearly all if
from foreign donors) has made unity and economic growth nearly
impossible. The donor nations warn that without a crackdown on the
corruption and the clan rivalries the foreign aid will be reduced and
what does arrive will have a lot more conditions attached. These include
bringing in foreigners to supervise the spending of the aid. If the
foreign aid supervisors are unable to work because of threats and
violence, the aid will stop. Most Somali leaders don’t believe the donor
nations will completely withdraw and that the donors can be manipulated
via media exploitation of Somalis suffering from famine and disease.
The donor nations are also angry about how the government is
dealing with opposition or anti-corruption politicians. Murder is one of
the tactics the governing parties are believed to be using to silence
critics. The donor nations are also very upset at how the government has
treated rape victims who went public. The victims were arrested and the
government is trying to force the accusers to shut up. Somalis tend to
view this sort of misbehavior as tradition and the way things have
always been done.
There is growing sense of despair at the inability of Somalia
to govern itself. Some Somalis (like al Shabaab) blame foreigners for
interfering with Somalis internal affairs and manipulating Somalis into a
state of chaos. But the majority of Somalis know that the problem is
closer to home. Somalis have been battling each other, and their
neighbors, for centuries. Disunity is nothing new. Corruption has long
been the major flaw in Somali culture and the inability to cope with
this has turned Somalia into one of the poorest and violent countries on
the planet.
Then there's always the clan (tribal) politics, and the
inability of clan and warlord groups to compromise to form a united
government. Not enough Somali leaders have accepted the fact that the
old ways just are not working. Then again, many Somalis have a different
concept of peace and prosperity. In times past, the losers in these
tribal wars would all die, or be absorbed into the victorious tribe. But
these days you have international relief efforts. So millions of
Somalis are surviving on foreign aid. This refugee community produces
more angry young men, ready to take up the gun and go get some tribal
justice, or just get rich.
None of this is new, but the donor nations are getting tired
to repetition. A decade ago Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia were advising
various factions in the Somalia peace talks in Kenya about how to
compromise and move forward. Back then Somali “traditions” had led to an
inability to decide how the initial parliament would be formed. This
would be the first government since 1991 and it seemed like an
impossible dream. The problem was in determining who would get how many
seats since, at that point, elections were not possible. Many of the
warlords had an exaggerated view of their own power (political or
military), and many withdrew from the final negotiations over allocating
the parliamentary seats. Without the participation and agreement of all
the major factions, the new national government would not work. It
seemed impossible to make the Somalis compromise and cooperate. While
the traditional clan leadership (a council of clan elders) was eager to
establish a new government, mainly because the elders see their kinsmen
dying from starvation and disease the powerful warlords (some of them
led by Moslem clerics) the clan leadership did not have the firepower to
force a settlement. The warlords caused death and fear as a matter of
course, and only perk up when they see their power threatened. The
warlords also knew that an effective national government could soon
become powerful enough to defeat and kill or imprison the warlords.
Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia each support, or dislike, some warlords
more than others. Dealing with the warlords has always been the key to
Somalia's survival as a nation and ultimately the other nations in the
region (especially Ethiopia and Kenya) had to send in troops to make it
possible to establish a national government. While many of the warlords
were persuaded to cooperate (or put out of business), they are still
gangsters at heart and national unity is not a high priority for them.
December 12, 2013: In central Somalia (Beledweyne) fighting
between rival clans left at least ten dead and nearly 20 wounded. In the
central Somalia town of Baidoa a group of armed al Shabaab men attacked
a government building without success.
December 11, 2013: The official investigation of the Westgate
Mall attack in September was leaked. It admits that the four attackers
may not have died but escaped during the chaotic effort to deal with the
attack. The police did uncover a network of Somalis and non-Somalis in
Kenya who aided the attackers and traced the movements of the four
attackers in the months prior to the attack. The four crossed into Kenya
in June and went to live in a Somali neighborhood in Nairobi. There
they made their final preparations, including many visits to the mall to
familiarize themselves with the place. The four days of shooting and
explosions inside the mall were largely the result of incompetent
leadership from the security forces. At least 67 people died in the mall
and 27 remain unaccounted for. Officially, Kenya insists that the
attackers were killed, but the police report admits that there is no
definitive proof.
December 10, 2013: In northeastern Kenya police clashed with
al Shabaab gunmen near the Somali border. Five policemen, three
civilians and at least two Islamic terrorists were killed during the
terrorist ambush. Two policemen are missing and presumed dead or
captured.
December 7, 2013: : In central Somalia (the Bakool region)
Ethiopian troops rolled into the town of El Barde to help the government
garrison deal with local al Shabaab gunmen still operating in the
countryside.
December 6, 2013: In Mogadishu al Shabaab fired several
rockets at the sports stadium but there was little damage and no
injuries. Elsewhere in the city an opposition Member of Parliament was
killed by a bomb under his car. This took place just outside a heavily
guarded government compound and opposition politicians accuse the
government of being behind killings like this and efforts to shut down
media outlets that do not agree with the government.
In south-central Somalia (Hiran) a peacekeeper from Djibouti
was killed and another wounded as they attempted to disable a roadside
bomb.
December 5, 2013: In the north (the port city of Bosaso in
Puntland) a suicide car bomber attacked a military convoy, killing seven
and wounding 37.
November 30, 2013: In Mogadishu a judge was killed. Such
murders are believed to be the work of criminal gangs or Islamic
terrorists, both of whom have an interest in convincing judges to be
less enthusiastic in dealing with illegal activity.
November 28, 2013: In the north (Puntland) rebel clansmen
attacked the convoy of the Puntland vice president. The attack failed
and a soldier and either others (rebels and civilians) were killed. The
Puntland government is trying to make peace in the area where the rebel
clan operates and if that fails troops will be brought in.
November 27, 2013: In the central Somali town of Beledweyne
police arrested over 500 people in the wake of an al Shabaab attack on
the 19th. Peacekeepers sent into the area have moved out into
surrounding areas taking control of four villages al Shabaab had been
using as bases and keeping the pressure on the Islamic terrorists. The
plan is to keep after the local Islamic terrorists until their
supporters and the gunmen are all arrested or killed.