The Geopolitical and Conflict Report
Written by Sim Tack
Monday, March 01, 2010
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Summary
It has been apparent for a while now that the Somali Transitional Federal Government has been preparing an offensive against the Al Shabaab rebels which control most of the country. At first it seemed this offensive would be mainly aimed at routing the Islamist rebels from the capital of Mogadishu, but recent movements by both sides had led to believe that a larger offensive in the likes of the Ethiopian invasion of 2007 would be in the makings. While first only government troops located in Mogadishu, backed by the African Union peacekeepers, seemed to be involved, it now seems that other parts of the country are being involved in the preparation of this offensive. The Ahla Sunna militia is ready in the Galgaduud region, other government troops are ready in the Gedo region and wile some government troops trained abroad have arrived in Mogadishu by ship, others have been located at the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya.
During the last few years the Somali government has sent troops abroad to receive training. These troops were trained in Kenya, Ethiopia and by French troops in Djibouti. Together these training programs mount up to thousands of fresh government troops, a huge influx of fighters on the side of the government. The lack of these troops may also clarify the resent inactivity by the Somali military. Now that they are set to return however, it seems that not all of these troops are sent to Mogadishu to expand security from there. Reports mention that troops trained in Ethiopia are located at the border between Ethiopia and Somalia, possibly to push through enemy terrain to take control of certain strategic locations in South Somalia. It is unclear whether the troops trained in Kenya, reportedly numbering about 1500, will return directly to Mogadishu by sea, or whether they may enter Somali territory by land. If the latter is the case it would be most logical that these troops would join remaining Somali government fighters in the Gedo region.
According to reports the Somali government troops trained in Ethiopia did not arrive alone. Ethiopian troops would supposedly have joined them. Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2007 and after more than a year of hard fighting against Somali insurgents they withdrew. The troops currently accompanying the Somali trainees may be instructors or trainers that will continue the training process into the Somali government troops’ mission. They may however also be combat troops to bolster the Somali force. Ethiopia has previously been reported to have its military operate within Somalia near its border after its withdrawal in January 2009. It is unlikely however that Ethiopia would be willing to commit as strong a force as they did in 2007 and therefore unlikely that this Ethiopian involvement will topple the balance in favor of the Somali government troops.
Somali government troops that were already located within Southern Somalia have also been making preparations for the potential offensive. Remaining scattered troops in the Gedo region have reportedly been making military movements in preparation of an expansion of their territory. Gedo remains the only region outside Mogadishu where government troops are still active. They are however too few to pose a threat to nearby Al Shabaab and Hizb Islam fighters to the south, toward Kismaayo, and to the east, toward Baidoa. It is unlikely that these troops could force anything unless they are heavily reinforced by trainees coming from Ethiopia or Kenya which both border the Gedo region. Because of this these troops carry no significant meaning in the upcoming offensive, it is more important to take note of which positions trainees coming from bordering countries take within Somalia and in which direction they will plot their advance.
The Al Shabaab, on the other hand, is not ignorant to the government’s preparations for this offensive. Just like the government it has been stockpiling weapons and ammunitions to prepare for this escalation. Upon taking note of the government’s intention the Al Shabaab also moved numerous military units from Bay and Bakool regions to the outskirts of Mogadishu where they would have been in position to counter early attempts by the government to break out of their encirclement. When it became clear, however, that troops trained in Ethiopia may be entering the country from north of the Bay and Bakool regions the Al Shabaab were quick to withdraw their troops from Mogadishu to retake position around Baidoa and other strategic locations in Bay and Bakool. Military units stationed in Kismaayo and Merka were dispatched to take positions in the outskirts of Mogadishu. This could have already been the maneuver that allows the Al Shabaab to halt the government offensive. It is likely that if the trainees from Ethiopia push south, the government troops in Mogadishu, backed by African Union troops, would push southwest to Kismaayo. This idea is strengthened by reported movements by African Union forces earlier this year that led to believe they would advance toward Merka. This means that Al Shabaab may have already been able to adequately spread its forces to cover all possible approaches of the government offensive. At the same time the government sees its time running out, with only a month left till the end of this dry season the offensive will need to make speed in order to secure important strategic towns before the advance is halted by the arrival of the rainy season in May.
While the government prepares its military offensive the Al Shabaab has not been sitting quietly. The Bay and Bakool command has organized its own offensive, not one aimed at the expansion of territory, but at the hearts and minds of the Somali citizens. While Al Shabaab holds the military power in most of South Somalia it suffers from a lack of trust by the people. This popular support will remain a problem to install an Islamic state if Al Shabaab ever does succeed to overthrow the government. As part of this the Al Shabaab has taken position to protect the indigenous farmers of Somalia and has warned the United Nations World Food Program that it ought to buy its supplies from Somali farmers instead of importing it. This has recently escalated into Al Shabaab forces halting WFP shipments on their way to IDP camps in the Afgoye corridor. WFP can not count on protection from African Union forces for these shipments and is unlikely to go against the threats of physical harm against the organization and its employees. The lack of food aid to the Afgoye corridor could result in a disastrous humanitarian situation.
As sides gear up for the upcoming violence within Somalia there have also been moves from the outside to weaken the Islamist rebellion. The African Union has demanded a no-fly zone above Somalia and a blockade of Somali harbors used by Islamists in order to halt the smuggling of weapons. Two months ago the United Nations Security council also decided to place sanctions on Eritrea which has been accused of delivering weapons to Somali rebel groups. The sanctions include a weapons embargo on Eritrea, a travel ban on Eritrean political officials and military officers as well as freezing financial assets of political officials and military officials. Whether these sanctions will be able to halt the smuggling of weapons through Eritrea remains to be seen. More importantly it shows how Eritrea is now entering the league of rogue states that are opposed by all western nations also involved in supporting the Somali government.
The upcoming offensive by the Somali government is likely to once again escalate the armed conflict in Somalia when initiated, but it is unlikely to result in a victory of the government over Islamist rebels. Islamist rebels hold a strong position and have been able to identify potential courses of action to be taken by the government as well as take action to prevent these. Due to the short frame of time for the government to complete this offensive and the positions of both sides it is possible that the advance will bog down before different advances connect to each other and are able to sustain each other. Some territory may be won but the balance of power in South Somalia will likely still tip toward the Al Shabaab by the time the next rainy season sets in.
Source: The Geopolitical and Conflict Report