What Role Should the U.S. Play in Somalia?

Somalia's last stable central government fell in 1991. In the sixteen years since, anarchy has reigned in the nation at the tip of Africa's Horn. Warlords became the primary power brokers in the security vacuum until 2006, when a fundamentalist group called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) ascended and threatened to topple Somalia's feeble Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Ethiopia intervened, routing the UIC and giving muscle to Somalia's weak national government. The United States, fearing the failed state would become a haven for terrorists, launched air strikes at suspected al-Qaeda operatives as they fled the Ethiopian offensive. Ethiopia's troops remain in Somalia, where a hostile population wants them out but the fragile security situation prevents their withdrawal.

Terrence Lyons is an associate professor of conflict resolution at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and interim director of the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University. Sadia Ali Aden is president and co-founder of the Somali Diaspora Network.

Sadia Ali Aden and I agree on the interlinked imperatives to make the transitional government more inclusive and to find a mechanism to withdraw Ethiopian forces from Somalia. A robust UN peacekeeping force with a strong mandate could play a constructive role but the challenges in deploying the Africa Union force and the memories of the UNOSOM experience in the early 1990s make this an unlikely outcome. Furthermore, I remain more skeptical than Ms. Aden that Washington is likely to play the key role in sponsoring talks between the TFG and elements of the UIC.

Washington’s recent engagement in the region has left it with little credibility to broker such discussions. The United States took a series of actions that signaled its opposition to the UIC, including Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer’s characterization of the UIC as “controlled” by al-Qaeda and the promotion of UN Resolution 1725 in December 2006 that clearly favored the TFG over the UIC. Furthermore, in January 2007 the United States used AC-130 gunships to attack targets in southern Somalia, in an unsuccessful effort to kill key UIC leaders. While the regime in Addis Ababa intervened in Somalia in pursuit of its own security interests, the close military and political links between the United States and Ethiopia further compromise Washington. I fear that it will require contortions beyond merely “bending over backward” to convince many Somalis of Washington’s “even-handedness.”

There are, however, other related opportunities that may offer greater promise. One of the dynamics that makes violence in Somalia potentially so explosive is that it feeds into and in turn feeds off of other conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. These include internal conflicts within Ethiopia, as seen in the attack by the Ogaden National Liberation Front on the Chinese oil workers in April. The unresolved conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has led these two rivals to support opposing sides within Somalia, thereby creating conflict by proxy. Implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement that ended the brutal 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is off the rails and tensions along the highly militarized border are rising without an effective international framework in place to manage the conflict. Washington’s close relationship with Addis Ababa may provide it with the kind of access and leverage that can promote peace on these fronts, and thereby reduce the potential for the Somali conflict to spread throughout the Horn.

While I agree with Prof. Lyons on his assessment of the failed Ethiopian/TFG partnership to maintain peace and order in Mogadishu and the brutality of their heavy-handed campaign, I differ with his perception that “the window of opportunity opened in early 2007 has virtually closed.”

I am of the opinion that Washington still has a golden opportunity to help restore peace and order in Somalia and re-cultivate a relationship based on mutual respect and indeed interest without sending American soldiers to Somalia.

This golden opportunity does not exist because the TFG might be willing to hold a “reconciliation conference” in Mogadishu (when the said entity itself is a party to the conflict), but because the U.S. is the only stakeholder who has the necessary capacity and clout to bring both the TFG and the UIC to the negotiation table. It is the only actively involved external stakeholder whose strategic interest is directly dependent on the stability and the reconstitution of the Somali state.

Both the timing and the environment are conducive to constructive engagement. All attempts to enforce peace through military might have proven a failure. The only opportunity remaining is through direct diplomatic engagement.

The brutality of the Ethiopian forces has dwarfed any previous American sponsored acts of violence. Nevertheless, Washington’s foreign policy remains suspect in the eyes of the majority of Somalis and Muslims around the world. 

With this backdrop, Washington may have to bend over backwards (if necessary) and demonstrate its commitment, and more importantly, even-handedness in helping build a broad-based government.

Certainly the newly appointed Special Envoy for Somalia [John Yates] could play a major role. That is if he prudently avoids the pitfalls that ultimately discredited other diplomatic officials from the State Department.

In the immediate term, here are some alternatives that ought to be considered:

1. Developing a clearly articulated policy on Somalia. (Washington can neither be ambivalent in its commitment nor haphazard.)
2. Pressure Ethiopia to disengage and immediately end its military occupation and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to rapidly replace them with Blue Beret forces.
3. The State Department should tone down its alienating rhetoric vis-a-vis the moderate leadership of the UIC and those former parliament members (including the former Speaker of the Parliament) who now oppose the TFG.
4. Engage and empower the Somali Diaspora. This block offers untapped influence and the will to fix their homeland of origin.

Five months after the Somali Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops ousted the Union of Islamic Courts, it appears initial hopes of a stable regime have been replaced by disappointment and frustration. Conditions in Somalia have deteriorated and there is evidence that an organized insurgency has coalesced in Mogadishu. The TFG remains narrowly based and unpopular. Violence in March and April reached tragic heights as Ethiopian troops used heavy artillery and mortars against neighborhoods it claimed housed Islamic militants. According to UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes, 300,000 have fled the city and “in terms of numbers and access to them, Somalia is a worse displacement crisis than Darfur or Chad.”

The primary issue in Somalia remains finding a sustainable basis for an inclusive government that can provide security. The TFG did not seize early opportunities to reach out to disaffected members of the Hawiye clan that dominate Mogadishu or to moderate UIC leaders. A promised reconciliation conference has been postponed and is unlikely to encourage broader participation if it convenes in Mogadishu where some key leaders refuse to meet until Ethiopian troops withdraw.

The TFG would not be in control Mogadishu and other parts of southern Somalia without the support of Ethiopian troops. Many in Mogadishu oppose the TFG, viewing it as a narrow clan coalition and as a client of Ethiopia and the United States. The challenge today, as it was in January, is to get the Ethiopian troops to withdraw without creating a vacuum that will spark further bloody conflict.

From the beginning of the intervention Ethiopia pledged to leave quickly. Washington, Addis Ababa, and others have endorsed a plan developed by the Africa Union to bring in a relatively small peacekeeping force to replace Ethiopian troops. A first contingent of some 1,600 troops from Uganda has been in Mogadishu since March. Other potential troop contributors, however, are reluctant to join the mission without a clearer political strategy. Four Ugandan peacekeepers were targeted and killed by a roadside bomb on May 16, making it less likely that other African states would join in the AU mission.

With the process of political reconciliation yet to begin and with the prospect of a viable AU force to replace Ethiopian troops dimming, it seems that the window of opportunity opened in early 2007 has virtually closed. The lack of a workable political or security plan is leading events to spiral toward greater violence with the potential that conflict will spread further. Ethiopia seems trapped: On the one hand it cannot withdraw without leaving behind chaos while on the other its presence makes the formation of a broadly inclusive government difficult.

Source: Council on Foreign Relation, May 23, 2007