Hani Garabyare
Friday, October 29, 2010
The African Union Mission in Somalia mandate drafted in 2007 declared to:
1. Provide support to the TFI (now TFG) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation
2. Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance
3. Create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development
While, the proposed mandate seemed short and precise – nevertheless there was a high level of ambiguity. What is painfully obvious even after three years of the mission is that there was never a definitive detailed analysis on how to achieve the intended goals, and what different dynamics would be involved. Instead Mogadishu and the whole of south Somalia has been rift with ongoing suffering, and displaced civilian population who have fled to various countries in Africa, while Al-Shabaab is gaining strength in numbers.
Peacekeeping and outsider intervention missions are seldom if ever successful and as past interventions in Mogadishu has shown – victory comes at a very high price. In essence peacekeeping missions are meant to have neutrality, but when peacekeepers are threatened their first reaction is to pick up their weapon, but peace cannot be imposed by the barrel of the gun – even if all measures taken have gone astray.
Historically, indigenous citizens will come to view peacekeepers as the enemy, and that is what has happened in Somalia. Somalis are moderate people, and Al-Shabaab’s ideology isn’t something any Somali would be for. But because Somalis are known to prize their freedom and do not like foreigners in their regions, coupled with Al-Shabaab’s strategic ploy to turn the populace against the peacekeepers, and to blame them for the loss of life (even though they themselves are to blame) many of the civilians have now allied with Al-Shabaab in a “lesser of two evils” principle.
Al-Shabaab’s interests are not primarily about the Somali people, but their need for authority and the only way to overcome this problem (which is far worse than the warlord-era, since they are using religion instead of the old politics as usual mantra) is to weaken the infrastructure of Al-Shaabab.
In order to do this, the deployment of 20,000 African Union troops must stop, and the troops already in the city must withdraw. Instead, what the United Nations and Western governments should do is to train the Somalis who live in the regions controlled by Al-Shabaab since they are wholly against the extremists. Thus, Al-Shabaab will no longer use the excuse that invaders are in Somali regions, but instead there will be other Somalis fighting for their rights. Not only will this cause strain in their plan, but soon infighting will emerge and just like other eras in Somali history that caused contention this too will have the same predicament.
Hani Garabyare is a Mogadishu born Somali-American, her interests lie primarily in policy reformation, youth empowerment and women’s rights in Somalia. She can be reached at [email protected]