Hiiraan Online

by Mahdi Warsama
Tuesday, May 21, 2013

"Be Humble in Victory, Gracious in Defeat " (Unanimous).

History is on the side of peace makers

With different degrees of success and difficulty, the first success stories of Somali Republic after the civil war in terms of peace building and the establishment of local administrations were in the northern part of the country, otherwise known as Somaliland and Puntland. In the case of Somaliland, the peace process did not start in luxurious hotels located in some foreign capitals, or because of the mediation skills of some foreign diplomats. Rather, the peace process started as a result of the mediation skills of the local traditional leaders. There was a conscious effort on the part of all clans to end the hostilities and reject the warlords. For instance, the traditional leaders made a concentrated effort to reconcile between the warring Harti (Dhulbahante & Warsangeli) and Isaaq militias in and around the town of Erigaabo, and similar hostilities between Habarjeclo and Habar-Yoonis in and around the town of Burao. The genuine political process and institution building got underway only after the tribal conflicts were contained in around 1997. Furthermore, the administration of late Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Igal, a seasoned politician, in cooperation with the traditional leaders of all clans avoided the contentious issues such as, imposing his rule on anti-secession regions of the east and the militarization of the SSC regions. In fact, to avoid a conflict with the anti-secession inhabitants of those regions, the official policy of Igal administration was to demilitarize the SSC region. For instance, during the constitutional referendum in May 2001, Igal agreed to recall his foreign minister, Abdihamid Garad Jama, who was carrying referendum ballot boxes from Lasanod after two prominent Dhulbahante traditional leaders at the time, Garad Abdikani Garad Jama and Garad Saleban Garad Mohamed called him and requested the removal of the ballot boxes from Lasanod before any vote took place. The result was a peaceful referendum at pro-secession regions of the northeast and no referendum at anti-secession regions of the east without any eruption of hostilities.  

The hostilities and the militarization of the SSC regions was later initiated by Igal's successor Dahir Rayale Kahin, politically inexperienced, and a colonel in Barre regime's intelligence service after Somaliland parliament passed its misguided, "Border Closure Legislation" in late 2003. The legislation called for Rayale administration to reach the southern border of former British Somaliland with Italian Somaliland or Somalia and Somaliland border as they claim, which is very long border between Sool and Nugaal provinces on one side and Sanaag and Bari province on the other side. This declaration was a significant enough provocation for Puntland to enter Lasanod with the support of local population as a preemptive strike against Somaliland intentions. This was the beginning of the current conflict and the militarization of SSC regions. After four years of series of small battles and skirmishes between the two sides, Somaliland forces finally captured Lasanod, the capital of Sool region in October of 2007, after some local politicians and militias switched sides. But, in the final analysis, the so-called "Border Closure Legislation" and the occupation of Lasanod did not achieve their intended purposes for Somaliland. For one anything, Somaliland forces never reached and realistically will never have reached the former British Somaliland border.  Their presence is limited to a very narrow strip of the highway between Aynaba and Lasanod with the exception of one battalion recently stationed near the town of Xudun. This means, after four years of occupation, Somaliland still does not control the majority of the districts in the vast southern and eastern parts of Sanaag region, heavily populated district of Buuhoodle in Togdheer region, and the majority of districts and villages in the Sool region including, Xudun, Taleex, Kalabaydh, Boocame, and many smaller villages located at the Ethiopian border and in the Nugaal Valley. If anything, the capture of Lasanod by Somaliland only deepened the rift by stirring up ant-Somaliland sentiment in the region, radicalized the local population who started arming themselves, ruined the local economy, and created thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) within the region. In addition, the untold story of Somaliland occupation of Lasanod is, this town is ungovernable for Somaliland. One Somaliland soldier from Hargeysa area who is stationed in Lasanod once told me that, “All the Somaliland soldiers from outside SSC consider the transfer to Lasanod as a death sentence." That is because many Somaliland officials including, judges, military officials, local governments’ officials, and regular soldiers were assassinated by unidentified conspirators. The local population's opposition to Somaliland occupation and its secessionist aspirations is very evident from the actions of all thirteen Dhulbahante traditional leaders who left Lasanod after the invasion and vowed not to return until Lasanod is liberated. These same traditional leaders were later instrumental in the establishment of Khaatumo State.

More conflict is not anyone’s interest

When the current Somaliland president, Mohamed Mohamud Siilanyo, a veteran politician who hails from the neighboring town of Burao was elected, there was a great hope that he will seek a peaceful solution to the SSC conflict. Unfortunately, all those hopes were dashed after the new president repeatedly mishandled the crisis starting from Kalshaale land dispute between two sub-clans from Dhulbahante and Habarjeclo (Isaak) respectively and his recent failed attempt to capture the town of Buuhoodle. Even after the formation of Khatumo State by all inclusive Dhulbahante stakeholders and representatives conference, Siilaanyo administration still lives in a peculiar state of denial. Many peace activists and intellectuals in the region believe the reason behind President Siilaanyo’s bellicose approach to Lasanod occupation is for local audience to prove his toughness and resolve with the staunchly pro-secession population in the northeast. But that also contradicts his approach to the other SSC town of Buuhoodle where Somaliland forces have completely withdrawn after several attempts to capture the town failed. The withdrawal of outskirts of Buuhoodle as peace overture quickly faded after Somaliland forces attacked the Nugaal Valley town of Xudun which is the cause of latest heightened tensions between Somaliland and Khaatumo along with the local population. The lingering question for all concerned is whose interest the perpetual conflict of the SSC or Khaatumo region serves given the fact that Somaliland has already failed to force the local population into submission. For sure it does not serve Somaliland’s interest well because it only exposes the division within the former British Somaliland region to the international community, already weary of the secession and to the Mogadishu government who wish to have a united North to negotiate with. Certainly, it does not serve Khaatumo administration’s interest because they too are yearning for peace and their fair share of the reconstruction of Somalia. In fact, this conflict and the consequent division of the northern community diminishes the only two possible outcomes of Somaliland secession aspirants are supposedly aiming for: complete independence from the South or using the secession to nullify 1960 so-called Act of Union and then renegotiate with the South to get a better political arrangement.

The current factionalized North is unsustainable

Ethnic or tribal based party politics is pathetic, uncivilized, and backward. I call it Somali killer disease. Almost every Somali sometimes tabs to this cheap, yet unscrupulous insurance policy called tribalism. Tribal identity is increasingly becoming a connection, state, political party, political philosophy, and insurance system for all Somalis. In the absence of meaningful political settlement with the unionist regions, the current Siilaanyo led Somaliland administration is increasingly becoming one tribe entity in practice. The newly emerging administration of Khaatumo as well as still prospective states of Awdal and Maakhir are nothing more than tribal entities invigorated by their opposition to the secession. For that reason, it is imperative that northerners change this trajectory and start a dialogue between unionist and secessionist communities of the territory. The current composition of former British Somaliland is not sustainable either as an independent state or under federal Somalia. The issues of power structure, constitution, representation, political parties, resources sharing, and districting have to be revisited in the extremely unlikely scenario of independence from the South since there are entire communities who never participated in those policies and their subsequent institutions when they were instituted in a decade ago. Under the likely scenario of under federal Somalia, the Northern communities need to decide many internal issues, including the number of federal states from the northern territory with the definition of its composition, constitution, borders, and level of autonomy among themselves and between the North and the South. The notion that all Northern issues will be decided through one-sided negotiations with the South is disingenuous and terribly misleading. The North has to put its act together and collectively decide what they want, how they want, and who will represent them in these negotiations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the former British Somaliland territory of Somalia is increasingly becoming more factionalized, militarized, and tribalized. The emergence of anti-secession administrations combined with increasingly more stable South will deprive the North of any favorable outcome from North-South negotiations. Instead of instituting one-sided winner takes all policy, it is imperative that the Northern communities go back to their peace building roots and start reconciliation dialogue among them and decide their future together before any haltingly arranged negotiations with the South. Any reconciliation process among the Northern communities must be handled very delicately and be pursued with all urgency because it involves very sensitive issues with many sacred cows. Postponing thorny issues, such as demilitarization of the Khaatumo region is not a policy; it is a problem avoidance, which breeds more conflicts in the future. Any reconciliation process among the Northern communities must be all inclusive and a civil society led process without any pre-conditions. Peace activists, such as Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame Hadraawi and certain key traditional leaders must play a big role. Finally, unionists from different tribes and regions have to unite for a common purpose and play a big role in these discussions, while avoiding a confrontational language against secessionists.