Hiiraan Online

by Heikal I. Kenneded
Sunday, April 14, 2013

Unfortunately, most Somalis tend to deny the existence of ethnic minority groups in Somalia and much worse ignore their plight of being discriminated against since the dawn of the Somali history. Nevertheless, minorities in Somalia were originally considered as any of the clans or communities that did not belong genealogically to any one of the three dominant clans, such as Hawiye, Darod, and Dir clans. Ironically, the agro-pastoral Raxanweyn clans who represent more than one-third of the country’s population were originally considered as a “minority,” and at the height of the civil war most of their farms and land were appropriated by the invading militias.  In fact, the current political strife in Kismayo and the race among major dominant clans to take control over the Lower Juba regional reminds me during the early days of the civil war, when dominant clans were competing to take control over certain key provinces located in the interriverine area of southern Somalia in order to exploit the fertile land in these regions. Enticed by the ecological richness of the Juba-Shabelle valley region, the armed conflict that began in early 199os to overthrow the dictatorship regime has incongruously turned into a struggle between the dominant clan groups for control over natural resources. Most of the economically important interriverine areas were originally inhabited by “minority” clans, who were usually peaceful and never had the possession of weapons or military capacity to defend themselves and their land from the marauding militias.

Several prominent districts located in the interriverine area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, including Janaale, Afgoye, Marka, Barawe, Jilib, and Qoryoley the minority indigenous tribes or communities who rightfully owned most of the land were forcibly displaced by dominant clans who claim to have liberated these lands from the “illegal occupation” of the deposed Siyad Barre regime, and therefore declared themselves as the proper owners of the land.  For example, the displacement of the reer Gosha or "Mushunguli" communities in the lower Juba Valley is one of the most hideous outcomes of the Somali civil war. In effect, thousands of reer Gosha farmers were displaced and their agricultural resources were plundered, resources for which these communities depended for their very existence.  Not to mention the absolute displacement and expulsion of the Barawan communities from Barawe at the height of the civil war, as one of the most despicable outcomes of the war. Moreover, the recent famine in the south of the country, and all the other misfortunes associated with the intra-state violence in southern Somalia is compounded by considerable human rights abuse against ethnic minority communities along the Shebelle and Juba River valleys. 

There is much to admire about the governing policies so far pursued by President Hassan Sheikh during his first few months in the office.  He has indeed turned a corner by skillfully blending strategic optimism with tactical maneuver, while he has made the most out of a fragile state that could go either way – a turn for the worse or a greater resolve. Only one flaw seems to betray the President’s trudge towards greatness, however. Despite the fact of advocating good governance and human rights on top of his priorities list, there are indications that a disregard for minority rights, which lies at the heart of most conflicts in some of the most contested regions in the country. Thus, the current Somali government’s mandate should be based on one that protects the rights and properties of ethnic minorities at the regional level in order to achieve a lasting peace based on justice and freedom for all.

Most Somalis would like to see stronger governance across three broad categories of endeavors. First, to demonstrate stronger resolve in establishing a safe and security environment in all government held provinces and towns in the country. It is imperative that new territorial gains from previously held by the Al-Shabab militia must not come undone at the expense of intra-political squabble with regional state authorities. In other words, the government must maintain its foothold in all areas under its administration and therefore secure the progress in these areas. Second, to demonstrate a greater resolve the transitioning of the country into a federalism state government system, in a clan based country like Somalia. In fact, this is one of the most intractable issues currently facing the government, which will test the new government’s ability to lead and govern the rest of the country. Finally, the new government must reform the botched justice system that became obsolete over the last two decades and build a credible judicial system that will ultimately protect the rights of all Somalis, including the especial rights of ethnic minorities. The President’s legacy will most likely be defined by how he succeeds in resolving the federalism issue, which at the moment doesn’t seem to include in his “six pillar” policy during his first four-year term. In other words, if Somalia cannot effectively deal with its provincial governance and allows the meddling of rogue warlords packed by unhelpful foreign governments, it will set a terrible precedent for dealing with the overall security issue of the country.

Somalia’s image around the world has quite recently improved and this should give the government a tremendous leverage to independently put its house in order. Both the President and Parliament need to demonstrate a strong resolve when it comes to implementing internal crisis-management. The final constitution document should draw a red line that no regional government is above the federal constitution and respect for the rights of ethnic minorities as the core of its constitutional principle. Despite the crippling budget constraints that the government currently operates, it can influence the political reigns of most of its regional states, however. The question is how far reaching its influence can change for the better the dynamics of the country’s various emerging regional states in order to raise awareness and empower different stakeholders, including the “minorities” on human rights primarily of the ethnic minorities at both the regional and national level.

A long thorny road lies ahead to correct all past mistakes, but the recently concluded judicial reforms conference in Mogadishu is a step in the right direction that should pave the way for the legal, policy and institutional framework to address important themes of ethnicity and human rights issues relevant at the regional levels. There is an urgent need for a national policy that recognizes different ethnic groups in the country and ethnic minorities beyond the current classification based on the notorious 4.5 system. This new policy should incorporate issues of subjection and vulnerability endured by most minority groups and thus recognizing the need to protect and promote the rights of ethnic minorities throughout Somalia, especially at the regional level.  In other words, it is imperative as a starting point for the government to sincerely acknowledge that there are ethnic minorities in Somalia and they’ve disproportionately suffered discrimination and other human rights violations during pre-and-post-civil-war. In effect, these minority communities should be recognized as the legitimate residents of certain regions, towns, and districts with rights to political representation on district councils and MPs.

In summary, the new Somali government has to commit to putting an end of the illegal appropriation and displacement of defenseless ethnic communities’ land and properties in the Mid-and-Lower Juba River valley. Otherwise, the search for a lasting peace in Somalia will perpetually remain elusive and problematic, as long as the government fails to address the structural violence that has greatly contributed to the intrastate crisis of the country, in the first place.