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by Mohamud M Uluso
Saturday, February 14, 2009
At the outset, I share the sincere gratitude and praise expressed towards the Government and people of Djibouti for their endless efforts of hosting numerous Somali reconciliation talks since 1991. The concluded talks between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia-Djibouti (ARS-D) were dubbed “Djibouti V.” However, as I said 11 months ago, Djibouti process lacked objectivity, transparency and realism and was inadequate to address the challenges created by the multiple causes underlying the conflict and statelessness in Somalia. The two sides avoided addressing the fundamental challenges underpinning the Somali crisis except the issue of TFG reform or power sharing as the latter will take care of all challenges. The reason was that they were pursuing a narrow political interest rather than comprehensive political solution to the Somali conflict.
My passionate desire and interest to see a peaceful and stable Somalia with a functioning Democratic Government[1] led me to plea for a halt to the implementation of the political aspects of Djibouti talks by postponing the expansion of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) and subsequent election of Speaker and President for thorough review. My plea was echoing the recommendations made by various reputable research institutions in the last few months and the reality on the ground.
My hope was threefold: First to encourage the leaders of the two sides to develop a reliable realistic internal consensus particularly within the Re-Liberation movement for political dialogue and reconciliation. Second to benefit from the change of US policy on “war on terror” ushered in by the election of President Barack Obama. Counter-terrorism measures pre-empt efforts of state building in Somalia. The Human Rights Watch called the United States and EU to rethink their flawed policy approaches to the Horn of Africa as whole[2]. And finally to develop a comprehensive strategy that responds to the multiple causes of the Somali crisis.
I believe the failure of implementing the agreed security arrangement between TFG and ARS-D, fragmentation within the Re-Liberation movement, Al Shabab’s surge and capture of Baidoa town, seat of the Transitional Federal Parliament, and the disarray of the Transitional Federal Government after the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed were sufficient reasons to halt the process for re-examination. The International Crisis Group (ICG) stated in its last report on Somalia[3] that “the key aim of the Djibouti architects was to create a powerful alliance capable of stabilizing Somalia, marginalizing the radicals, and stemming the tide of Islamic militancy. But this was quickly undermined by the split within the ARS and TFG and the rapid take over of most of southern and central Somalia by the insurgency elements that reject the process. Consequently, Djibouti became a dialogue between weak parties with little weight on the ground.” In my humble view, the scale and complexity of the Somali conflict requires strong will, capacity and comprehensive strategy for response. Amazingly, the Djibouti process circumvented these considerations.
Alternative to the controlled format of Djibouti process, ICG report recommended a credible political process with wider scope and larger participation. Some of the issues suggested for agenda included the drafting of a new constitution that will clarify among others the internal state boundaries for Somaliland and Puntland regions and constitutional referendum process; the integration of all armed forces into a common army and the establishment of regional police forces; and the establishment of transitional justice mechanism addressing impunity and national reconciliation requirements as well as the appointment of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity by all sides.
Finally, ICG report recommended a change of US counterterrorism strategy in Somalia, the removal of individuals and groups from the terrorist lists and a support for political approach and intra-Somali negotiations. The ICG’s analysis and recommendations have been available to the sponsors of Djibouti process and the public but unjustified rush trivialized all.
Jon Lunn of House of Commons Library[4] argues that “in the short to medium term, the keys to peace and security in the Horn of Africa –Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan- lie in: first, resolving the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their common border; and second in constructing a durable domestic political and economic settlement in Somalia that is acceptable to the majority of Somalis and to the external actors.” Majority of the international experts on Somalia share this view.
It seems that the ultimate goal of Djibouti talks would be the exoneration of Ethiopian forces and their accomplices from accusations of war crimes and human rights violations committed against Somali citizens, acceptance of Ethiopian interference in the Somali affairs, a continuation of regional instability, de-legitimization of the struggle led by the Re-Liberation movement, and territorial disintegration and spread of despair. The lack of vision, common beliefs and interest will undermine the new Federal Government. The new name “Government of National Unity” is misleading.
Immediately after the election of President Sheikh Sharif, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abballah made clear that the support of the international community will depend on the determination of the new government to promote “stable” and “tolerant” Somalia. Analyst Roger Middleton of Chatham House, a foreign policy think-tank, reiterated that the international community including IGAD will not support the new President if he engages in negotiations with a group listed as a terrorist organization. All these are clear evidence of the political commitments ARS-D has subscribed to before joining the Transitional Federal Government.
The Somali people have manifested their will and enthusiasm in support of every Somali Government established since 2000. Nevertheless all governments failed. Therefore, the failures of Governments and the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ARS) provide a lesson for pause and deep reflection on a strategy that could move Somalia from Statelessness to Statehood. Prof Ken Menkhaus noted that “[Djibouti] participants manipulate the peace talks and state revival to engineer a “victor peace” instead of forging genuine reconciliation.” The departure of Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein and the comatose situation of Speaker Mohamed Adan Nur will complete the transition from Mbagathi TFG to Djibouti TFG.
ARS-D takes over the power without cohesion, capacity, political vision or agenda for the country. ARS never articulated its political platform since its formation in Asmara, Eritrea. Expected distribution of plum government departments among ARS-D leaders is posted in the internet. Another failed, corrupt and inept Government will have catastrophic consequences on Somalia’s future.
The latest developments are indicative of the shortcomings of Djibouti process. The public told the President that the Government must espouse the Islamic Rule and support the immediate withdrawal of AMISOM forces. The President was also advised to engage in negotiations with his opponents. Another matter discussed with him was an immediate action against TFG officials who were accused of war crimes and violations of human rights and compensation for the victims of the Ethiopian occupation. He assured the public in different format his determination to fulfill those demands but without prospect. In this chaotic situation, the President is eager to move on and exercise his full authority to form a new Government in accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter. In the absence or insignificance of Somali political structure for consultation, advice, policy formulation with responsibility and accountability, key international sponsors are driving the state formation or composition. As part of the game, the new incomplete parliament of 550 could be forced to recess. The situation is teetering.
Another development that interferes with the internal situation include the surprise attack of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) for Somalia on local Media for reporting the killing of civilians by AMISOM forces and comparing them to Radio Mille Colline of Rwanda which incited Genocide. This has raised uproar within the international organizations. It is reported that SRSG has been requested to retract his statement and resign. Media censorship could be the most dreadful act at the moment. Al Shabab and the new Government are suspected of criminal acts to silence the media for different motives. The public must defend the Freedom of the Media for public interest.
Somalia is a country of 637,657 km2 with a population of roughly 12 millions. It has enviable resources but divided into fiefdoms. The secession proclamation of Somaliland and the autonomous status of Puntland regions have significant implications on the political settlement of Somalia. To my knowledge the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Somalia did not visit these places since the beginning of Djibouti process. The establishment of similar state(s) in the central and south regions will concretize the building blocks of Somalia on clan bases and could affect the long term viability of Somali State. A serious discussion on building “Regional States” without legitimate “national government” or building “Legitimate national government” that functions throughout Somalia and supports the stabilization of instable regions has the top priority. This will prevent balkanization of Somalia.
I believe the President’s struggle in day one with his old allies who became his foes is an indictment of Djibouti process. The popular acceptance of the Transitional Federal Charter as the law of the land is not yet settled. As a result, the Somali people are facing chaotic, distrustful and tense situation despite the efforts of traditional and religious leaders, and business community for calm, peace and reconciliation. Political Islam and terrorism, unity v. federalism or secession, foreign manipulations and trust deficiency are at the top of the challenges list. State formation starts after consensus has been achieved on fundamental challenges of the Somali conflict and not vice versa. If ARS-D was unsuccessful to secure the support of the majority of the Re-Liberation movement during the Djibouti talks, it will be more difficult and messy to get common ground of compromise now as TFG leaders. The Sana’a fiasco-agreements signed with the full knowledge of dishonoring them- is an example for the impossible rapprochement between the Union of Islamic Courts with different interests.
Mohamud M Uluso
[email protected]
[1] In his book (2008) of “the many faces of political Islam”, Prof Mohammed Ayoob argues that “the bottom line is that there is nothing in Islam that militates against Muslim polities adopting democratic forms of rule, just as there is nothing in Islam that prevents autocratic rule in Muslim Countries.”
[2] Human Right Watch “So Much to Fear -War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia”, December 2008.
[3] International Crisis Group, “Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State”, Africa Report N 147, 23 December, 2008
[4] House of Commons Library “Interlocking crises in the Horn Africa” Jon Lunn, Research Paper 08/86, 25 November 2008.