Djibouti Agreement Represents Another Spurious Attempt for Peace in Somalia

by Mohamud M Uluso
Sunday, August 03, 2008

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The majority of South Central people of Somalia has received the agreement signed in Djibouti on June 9 between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and faction of the opposition Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS-D) with mixed disappointment and skepticism. In fact, the New York Times of June 11 reported that “if the reaction to the accord struck on Monday night is any gauge, peace may still be a long way off.” The international community shoulders much of the blame for this spurious attempt for peace in Somalia.

Among others, four premises constitute serious obstacles to peace in Somalia. One, TFG which is synonymous with President Abdullahi Yusuf is credited as a legitimate government against the will of the Somali people. Two, Somalia is in theory united and sovereign territory but in practice it is divided into three or four separate territories without sovereignty. Three, the departure of Ethiopian forces will create security vacuum as there is security especially in South Central Somalia. Four, the protection of TFG presidency, Mogadishu port and airport is more important than the protection of the lives, properties and the future of 2/3 of the Somali population.

Some of the reasons for the disappointment and skepticism about the agreement are:

First, the UN-led process for organizing “Djibouti meeting” lacked transparency, comprehensiveness and objectivity. The hastily signed agreement after a week long seminar probably devised to circumvent ARS-D’s refusal of face-to-face meeting with TFG was not product of negotiation exercise between combatants addressing the real situation in Somalia. ARS-D leaders admitted that they signed the agreement “under duress”. The inclusion of the phrase “throughout the national territory” in the agreement exclusively applicable to the “South Central Somalia” surprised many.

Second, the top ARS leadership failed to act with accountability and responsibility. After the brutal battle for ARS top position in 2007, four developments took place. First, the Chairman of the Central Committee being resentful of his defeat started looking for another political fortune in exchange for leaving or wrecking ARS. He favored compromise with TFG based on Sana’a deal. Second, Ethiopia lobbied intensely to reach political accommodation with Islamist leaders in Asmara as a blow to Eritrea and divide and rule policy. Third, through discussions with the international community, ARS leadership became convinced that President Abdullahi Yusuf’s ousting from office is forgone conclusion. Fourth, some of ARS leadership felt that Eritrea is following open policy or not hierarchical approach in dealing with opposition forces.

As consequence, ARS delegation led by both Chairmen arrived in Nairobi in April for secret discussion with the International Community. Without internal deliberations, the two leaders agreed to pre-outlined political plan fashioned by UN for ARS’s renunciation of armed resistance. The plan going against ARS Charter set the stage for ARS schism. The abandonment of ARS’s declared cause by the two leaders without prior formal political process has proved the lack of accountability, transparency and collective responsibility within ARS and astonished ARS supporters, opponents and observers alike.

The “Djibouti meeting” formalized the division of ARS. In addition, it accomplished exclusion and humiliation of Eritrea, bolstering Ethiopia/TFG, and facilitating resource mobilization. Break up struggle within ARS just before Djibouti meeting has diminished the self confidence, relevance and bargaining power of ARS-D.

Third, ARS-D failed to secure its core demand of guaranteed withdrawal schedule of Ethiopian forces from Somalia. Clause 7(b) gives TFG the discretionary power to act on the issue after deployment of sufficient UN Forces. Also, ARS-D did not secure at minimum the return of IDPs to their homes by deploying Ethiopian/TFG forces outside Mogadishu and other places.

Still left out is PM Meles Zenawi unverifiable condition that Ethiopian forces will leave Somalia after jihads are defeated. The general consensus is that deployment of international stabilization force as pre-condition for Ethiopian withdrawal is way off.

Clause 7(C) demands ARS-D solemn public condemnation of all acts of armed violence in Somalia and dissociation from any armed groups or individuals and refrain from non peaceful declarations and actions. This simply means dissolution of ARS-D as political arm for armed resistance and oppressed victims from June 9, 2008. In nutshell, the requirements of the agreement are intended to de-legitimize the armed resistance against Ethiopian/TFG Forces in Somalia without parallel rightful restoration of freedom, protection, justice and democratic governance in Somalia.

Fourth, the agreement shifted focus from the urgent need to investigate the war crimes, atrocities and human rights violations committed mostly by the Ethiopian/TFG forces in the last 18 months to general description of the Somali guiltiness and deficiency of patriotism in the last 18 years. Victims of Ethiopian/TFG merciless attacks are reminded that the international community had blessed what is going on in Somalia.

Fifth, while the international community and Ethiopia- TFG’ allies - dominated the outcome of the agreement, Eritrea as ARS ally has been ostracized. Eritrea as other IGAD member countries gained interest in Somalia. The border clash between Eritrea and Djibouti during the talks has generated negative consequences that spilled over into Somali politics.

Sixth, the declaration to hold International Conference on Reconstruction and Development after 6 months appears impractical under all aspects unless there is deliberate attempt to defraud donor communities. Provision of funds to TFG means intensification of corruption and human rights abuses. TFG lacks minimum internal legitimacy and capacity to receive national and international resources on behalf of South Central people of Somalia.

Finally, TFG has shown no enthusiasm for Djibouti Agreement. President Abdullahi Yusuf asked the Security Council Mission in Djibouti the refocus of UN energies on the roadmap to rebuild TFG rather than on reconciliation process. Today’s reality is that the “eventual” withdrawal of Ethiopian forces does not depend on Somalia. Continuation of resistance looks more probable. The exclusion of Ethiopia along with neighboring countries from the international stabilization forces should be sufficient reason for immediate departure of Ethiopian forces from Somalia.

Mohamud M Uluso
Chair,
Arta Center for Governance and Development-Somalia

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