by Abdul Ahmed III
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Trapped in fantasy of a political settlement and/or unified statehood, many Somali affairs scholars, policy makers, journalist and politicians seem to be locked in a failing approach to constitute a lasting settlement. This is in part because of their overemphasis on forming a unified, centralized, Somali National Government. It is a fanciful thing to dream about formulating a lasting solution to the protracted Somali crisis, particularly one that calls for a centralized national government. But analysts and scholars are not alone; in fact international policy makers tend to further very similar goals without understanding and/or appreciating the fundamental social origins of the Somali problem. They justifiably but erroneously perceive Somalia as a single monolithic nation-state in need of international support to reconstitute a central authority. In the following paragraphs, I attempt to point out (1) the obsolete paradigm with which the Somali problem is often viewed and analyzed. (2) Rationality of collective clan behavior and its impact on statehood (3) the mismatch of clan based morality with statehood (3) and (4) Feasible policy options for the post collapse era.
Since last 20-years, the clan social system and its political implication was either ignored or misunderstood. It may be misunderstood as is manifested by the power sharing schemes that were designed for Somali groups to share power since 1991 which only resulted in 15 failed governments. More importantly, policy makers and the international players may be using an obsolete model of Somalia. Perhaps Somalia of 2010 is not the same as the Somalia of 1990; Is this Theseus Paradox ? But prior to casting Today’s Somalia as an obsolete model let us examine how and what drives the evolution of Somali politics. Is it the clan system? Is it the need for a nation-state?
Notwithstanding the contemporary socio-political evolution of Somali inhabited areas particularly the birth and demise of the short lived Somali Democratic Republic. There is no historical data that proves the existence of a unified Somali entity or a long lasting Somali peace. The idea of peaceful unified state for all Somali inhabited areas has always been an imprecise, unattainable and fuzzy concept.
Since the beginning of recorded Somali history, sadly clan based rivalries and all out wars had unleashed worst of human nature in an endless fierce competition for everything material and non-material alike. All Somali clan conflicts embody an element of (a) pride to uphold, revenge to conduct, (b) clan interest to better, (c) clan based morality to fulfill and (d) resources to compete for. Moreover, clan empathy and clan based morality have always been the driving force behind most clan conflicts. Clan based morality asserts itself as an obligation that often supersedes any other form of social recognition and human virtue.
It must however be admitted that clan based morality and clan conflict alone did not and does not preclude a sense of nationhood. Somali people are known to unite often in defense of their common interest when and if such interest is realized. Yet, historically, each clan (or group of clans) preferred to govern their affairs. In fact pre-colonial Somalia is known to be a nation of many states with diverse forms of self rule and a form of governance that distributed authority among the clans. This traditional, decentralized system was also a mechanism for conflict resolutions that ensured transient but effective peaceful co-existence.
Centralized governing structure in the Somali peninsula was first initiated by the European rulers. The fascist wars against Somali sultanates in central and northern Somalia (1922-1929) were the first attempts to centralize authority. The centralization of authority was later legitimized by the subsequent Somali governments between 1960 -1991. Rigidity of this imposed centralized control over clan affairs had rendered the clan based social interaction of Somali people so brittle that it eventually caused the demise of centralized authority and with it the sense of nation-state. It can also be argued centralization has produced some form of rent seeking behavior of clans on the expense of other clans.
In spite of the popular claim that clan competition is a result of dictatorship (of Barre regime) or even a result of colonial era legacy, there is yet to be any empirically grounded finding that documents such claims (except of course few deductively attained conclusions). Clan based rivalry and factionalism is historically and culturally ever-present (before and after the Barre regime). Clan conflict was very common in pre-colonial era, during the European rule and persisted throughout the short existence of Somali nation-state (1960-1991). Moreover, clan rivalries at times involve the use of missionaries, foreign powers to gain edge on other clans; a trend that continues till today.
The modern manifestation of clan alliances with non-Somali entities includes the use of foreign basis to fight the last Somali government in 1980s. As is with the case everything Somali, the use of foreign power is either condemned or commended, depending on the clan, its interpretation and the prevalent clan morality at any given time. For instance all clan based Somali factions e.g. SSDF, SNM, USC, SPM have used foreign basis (primarily Ethiopia) to fight against their unified nation-state. The supporters of now defunct United Somali Congress tend to have whole heartedly supported the launching of cross border raids from Ethiopia on Somalia including bombing of civilian targets, movie theaters, postal stations and the like. These acts were justified on the basis of clan morality and indeed these campaigns eventually led to the overthrow of Barre government in 1991. This also was (at least partially) a cause for the ensuing massacre of civilian population in Mogadishu 1991 (which again was justified through clan morality). It is this clan based moral value that allows one group to blame others when and if their clan interest is rivaled. For instance, the clans that supported USC’s alliance with Ethiopia in 1989-1991 seem to condemn SNF’s alliance with Ethiopia 1992-1994 to uproot extremist groups in the town of Luq Southwest Somalia.
What is the rationality of morality based on clan interest? If it is not an evolutionary residue from primates, the clan based morality would be only described as a self serving moral relativism that is most inconceivable and most intellectually debilitating for any sane human. Each clan’s actions are noble to its own members! To each clan, its history is more glorified than all other clans. This is the constructed social reality of clan based morality. Indeed, this clan based morality supplants any other virtue including nationhood, statehood or even humanity. Therefore, policy makers must account for the realities of this society and the implications of clan social structure on policy, politics and a nation-state. This is particularly important because the international community seems to impose a common and unifying Somali nation-state as a solution.
Many policy makers and scholars tend to minimize the importance and/or the relevance of clan identity in Somalia’s protracted conflict. They claim that calling attention to the role of the Somali clan is simply a restrictive primordialist view (even though clan identity doesn’t necessarily disallow other constructivist and instrumentalist views). It is the clan that allows the emergence of clan politicians that could manipulate the clan (an instrumentalist view).
Some scholars even argue that foreign powers are the reason Somalia could not constitute peace. Others argue that factors such as delivery of social service, justice and economic opportunity play far more significant role. Yet, these scholars fail to explain the manifestation of clan based behavior amongst Somali populations in the west. They conveniently ignore or are perhaps unable to admit the role of the clan as observed in Somali communities in the west. For instance, clan identity is demonstrably and unmistakably most ubiquitous and most noticeable in all social realities of Somali communities in Northern America and Europe. It is the very factor of clan that drives social bond not to mention the role of the clan in business, civic and other associations.
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Evidence points out that western social justice and economic opportunity cannot and could not do away with clan based social system and its morality of clan based competition. In fact, clan affiliation exclusively governs the entire processes of social, political and civic transactions of Somali people. It is the single most significant factor to consider while addressing the Somali problem.
It must not surprise anyone that even the religious extremism in Southern Somalia has an element of clan. Today’s religious fundamentalist predominantly come from certain areas or are stronger in certain areas. Most of the extremism confirms to the dictates of the clan system (perhaps in a subliminal manner). The recent conflicts in Jubbaland are clear indication of this fact.
In October 2009 while at a Somali related event, I was shocked by the claims of a prominent scholar who argued for the need to eliminate the Somali clan system (as if it is something that could be just casually deleted from the psyche of the society). Although, well meaning, the temptation for purely logical analysis to find solutions for the Somali conflict often leads to impractical, overzealous solutions that have neither local mandate nor any support from the very people it is intended to help.
The burning question is therefore, do the Somali politicians and their international allies pay enough attention to the significance of the clan ? Do they asses the effect of this social reality on policy toward political settlement? I argue that most politicians and all the international players do not understand the issue of clan based society as essentially a social one with serious political implications. The solutions that the international communities and the Somali politicians devised since 1991 were solely political solutions to primarily a social problem. The focus I believe must not be a politically driven power sharing plan but rather a social program that facilitates a political settlement as I explain below.
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Historically, Somali clans constituted rule of law, self rule and governance of social and natural resources through a unique and distributed system of command and control that relied on the consent of the clan groups. A form of a robust clan democracy that enabled Somali clans resolve their conflicts, share resource and even rally for a nationalistic causes. One such clan sanctioned unity is the 1530s unity under Imam Ahmed AlGhazi which was purely based on clan understanding rather than a centralized control by far away central authority.
It is unfortunate that the efforts of the international community focus primarily on constituting a central authority for all Somalia without any due regard to the underlying social realities of the post collapse realities or the social origins of the political question of Somalia. It seems that the clan factor is synthetically incorporated into the question but not in its natural format. For instance, the UN endorsed 4.5 scheme that was used to assemble the interim Somali parliament is a measure intended to provide fair power sharing among clans, yet most of the current members of the parliament do not have local mandate from the regions they are supposedly to represent. (This is particularly true for the parliamentarians from Somaliland and Puntland).
This shows that the paradigm used to design policy is an obsolete one based one a unified nation-state that only has to cope with political rivalry. Contrary, to the believes of the international community, the political question is far simpler than the underlying social conflict and economic rivalry between the clans.
Unlike the 1980s and early 1990s, the Somali population in the horn of Africa has more of a clan based social, political and demographic re-alignment. The New York Times reported in the 1990s that nearly four hundred thousand residents of Mogadishu have been forcefully removed from their home in Mogadishu. Most of these immigrated to other parts of Somalia mainly to Jubbaland, Puntland and Gedo Region. Similarly commerce routes and trade relationships have been reconfigured since the collapse of the state. For instance Puntland has far more robust trade with the Ogaden region than with the Southern part of Somalia (mainly due to clan relationship/affiliations). These realities must factor in any policy design for the former Somalia.
Most planners, analysts and international players face the Theseus Paradox when dealing with the issue of Somalia. Today’s reconfigured new realities are not fully recognized and appreciated by the interaction al community and Somali politicians alike. For instance Somaliland and Puntland are realities to contend with yet there is no any effort on the part of the international community to involve these quasi-states in the efforts to find a solution to the Somali problem.
The State of Puntland and the Republic of Somaliland have successfully constituted a socially approved, clan facilitated social solutions to deal with political problems in their part f the former Somalia. They represent new realities, a new dimension that must be recognized and awarded. Ignoring them will not result a better solution for the Southern Somali groups.
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Former warlords (now politicians) and their international allies must not impose a centralized unifying entity on Somali people. The international community should only facilitate regional settlements to address genuine grievances of Somalis against their fellow Somali. But more importantly all Somali people do not shy away from negotiating with each other at local level if allowed to. There is no country to govern!, there is no much of a resource to wage a war for. Why not allow the Somali people resolve their social conflict through their traditional clan based consultations? Why not allow these people find solution through the robust system that always secured their survival.
The international community must respect the desires and the dominion of the clan group over administering their own affairs as they see fit rather than be a nuisance. There is no and there will be no central government without the approval and blessing of all Somali clans and that cannot begin with power sharing scheme like the 4.5 plan. It must begin with clan negotiations, local settlement, independent states and perhaps eventually a union of Somali states.
Arguments on how to find a political solution for Somalia has become “argumentum ad infinitum” except that the arguments were always centered on national government for a unified Somalia. Perhaps the best way to save the Somali people is to save them from the current policies of the international community. The world should accept successful alternative approaches such as regionalism and the formation of regional groupings of self-administering states that could eventually unite in a confederation of Somali states. The idea of regionalism in the former Somalia is NOT an exactly episode of A Nightmare on Elm Street series. The Somali people are clan based society and perhaps the solution to their problems could only be achieved through genuine, robust, bottom-up, partitioned, and free traditional clan negotiations.
If the last 20-years could serve as a historical lesson, continuing with the misguided approach of centralized, national unity government will produce and only guarantee more of clan based rivalry and zeal for further destruction. The alternative approach of regionalism and self-rule, on the other hand, has been an incredible success story in Puntland and Somaliland. It is time for the Somali people and the international community to move on and accept this reality. It is time to acknowledge that we all have been trapped in Theseus Paradox! Today’s Somalia is not the Somalia that once was.
Abdul Ahmed III
Email: [email protected]
Contributor to The Horn of Africa Policy Institute
www.thoapi.org