Abdirizak Omar Mohamed
Thursday, July 03, 2008

In this essay I will try to present a different analysis as a rejoinder to these perspectives by examining all sides of the conflict including Ethiopia and Eritrea as outside spoilers and potential catalysts for the failure of this peace agreement, as well as present some suggestions to counter these obstacles. It’s noteworthy to highlight that I am a proponent of this Accord, yet skeptical about its success and very concerned about some of the provisions in the agreement.

Many of the write-up in the aftermath of the D’jibouti agreement expressed optimism yet unfairly over-emphasized the disagreement among the Alliance leadership as the likelihood catalyst for the failure of the agreement by spreading defeatist notions before the ink dried up; implying that the Alliance will not deliver what they have agreed to, due to the emerging disagreement among its leadership. In fact this is just a fig leaf intended as a smoke screen for Ethiopia's ambitious dream to prolong its illegal occupation by putting blame squarely on the disagreement between the ARS leadership. In hindsight, when taken into account the following factors, it becomes obvious any violation of the agreement is likely to arise from the TFG/Ethiopian opposition and not as a result of the conflict within the ARS, because the ARS is united in a matter of principle for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops through military or political solution.   

Ethiopia an outside spoiler

As demonstrated by the deeds and actions of Ethiopia in the past, it has always played an outside spoiler in all the past Somali peace agreements and perpetuated the Somali crises for the past 17 years and illegally invaded Somalia on December 2006.  In his response to this invasion, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia stated that "Our defense force has been forced to enter a war to defend [against] the attacks from extremists and anti-Ethiopian forces and to protect the sovereignty of the land." This could not be farther from the truth, as Ethiopia has been Somalia's perennial enemy and its desire to cause eternal crisis in Somalia is its chief objective.

As Quincy Wright (1965:2) rightly notes that war can't be said to be occurring when the antagonists do not recognize each other as participants, but see the opponent simply as an obstacle to the achievement of certain goals, as geographical barrier might be. From national security perspective, the Union of Islamic Courts could not pose danger to the sovereignty of Ethiopia as Ethiopia is more than capable to deal with threats from poorly armed militia. Accordingly, stakes are even higher for Ethiopia this time around for the following assumptions and it will utilize every trick in the book to derail the D'jibouti accord to pursue its historic hegemonic interest in the region:

 
a) The financial life-line that has been feeding Ethiopia’s regime for the past two years to fight off Islamic threats, real or imagined is likely to be cut off if the D'jibouti Accord is implemented and Ethiopia is forced to withdraw its troops from Somalia.

b) There is the likelihood that potential domestic uprising due to food shortage and higher unemployment rates as a result of draughts and Ethiopian government's regressive domestic policies.

c) The power of the puppet government of  Mr. Yusuf will be extremely diminished to the extent of any power sharing agreement that arises from the D’jibouti Accord will not serve the interest of Meles Zenawi.

Moreover, the geopolitical interest of Ethiopia is at play here and wants to keep Somalia in perpetual chaos; a case in point is this open letter titled "ETHIOPIA IS BEING CIRCLED BY ITS ENEMIES" and is addressed to the Ethiopian Diaspora, intellectuals, Ethiopian nationalists and government officials. In it the writer Mr. Tecola W. Hagos of Washington DC urges them to prevent the proposed D’jibouti reconciliation efforts initiated by the head of UNPOS, H.E. Ahmedou-Ould Abdalla, and the writer uses religion and nationalism as the basis for his reasoning and why it is obligatory on every Ethiopian citizen to take every step necessary to challenge and oppose Mr. Ahmedou-Ould Abdalla’s peace initiative. The writer demonizes Mr. Ahmedou-Ould Abdalla by tearing apart the envoy's personality and tarnishes Mr. Ahmedou-Ould Abdalla's report to the UN Security Council and claims the report is "a direct threat to the very existence of Ethiopia".  http://www.tecolahagos.com/Article_UN_Somali_Envoy2[1].pdf . Subsequently, during the peace process Ethiopia's ambassador in D'jibouti attempted to derail the peace process, and when that failed the feared head of the Ethiopian Intelligence Services in Somalia,  Mr. Gabre was dispatched to influence the TFG delegation and as stated by many close observers to the process accepted the agreement when amended to include a provision that will give a face-saving exit to the Ethiopians into the agreement in article Seven section B in which ' the TFG will act in accordance with the decision that has already taken by the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its troops from Somalia after the deployment of a sufficient number of UN forces".  As illustrative by the bolded italic, that addition was made to indicate Ethiopia has already made a decision to withdraw, when in fact it was included to meet the demands made by Ethiopia’s Gabre.

TFG as an inside spoiler

Though Ethiopia failed to wreck the outcome of the D’jibouti Accord to its benefit, its cronies in Baydhabo are at full force to hamper the peace process to serve their masters in Addis Ababa. According to local sources in Baydhabo, parliamentary members closely allied with the Ethiopians are contemplating to introduce a motion to remove the TFG Prime Minister to create political crisis that will bring down his government and open doors to new opportunities to justify Ethiopia’s presence in Somalia for a protracted time and eventually kill the entire peace process. Others including the TFG president are making controversial statements on local radios to discredit the accord by attacking the personalities associated with peace process.

Other members of the TFG parliament will oppose simply for their personal interest as they benefit from the war economy and aid and donor money, while they are also concerned about what the uncertain future holds for them. 

Recommendations

As Sally Healy of Chatham House puts it in her latest report, ‘Ethiopia has become deeply embroiled in Somali politics and has invested too heavily to settle for a quick exit.’ Indeed, the terrorism rhetoric by Meles Zenawi is just a devious ploy and what drives fundamentally its policy is the existing dispute with Eritrea. And this is equally true with respect to Eritrea and that the welcome reception extended for the ARS is not what shapes its policies towards Somalia, but is using the presence of the ARS as bargaining chip to divert international attention from its regressive domestic policies and its border dispute with Ethiopia, a case in point is its opposition to the currently signed D'jibouti Accord. Given these realities, and the fact that both are using Somalia to conduct their dirty proxy war and both have captive audiences that could derail the peace process, it is paramount that following steps are taken concurrently;