Daily Monitor
Monday, February 27, 2012
The recent announcement of al-Shabaab joining al-Qaeda is not really
news, just an attempt to shore up an on-and-off relationship that began
in 2003 when Aden Hashi Farah “Ayro” and a small group of Somali
Jihadists returned from Afghanistan looking to stir up things in the
Horn of Africa country.
Al-Shabaab as a recognised group became formalised during the
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. The roots of al-Shabaab also come
from al-Qaeda’s origins in East Africa and their quest for establishing
training and hideout cells in the region. Unfortunately, Somalia’s
unique sense of identity, pride and moderate nature has always clashed
with al-Qaeda’s more radical and anti-tribal dogma.
Now, the question everyone is asking is: Does this
mean anything significant in the Somalia peace process and the global
war on terror? Some pundits have simply pointed out that al-Qaeda can’t
do much for al-Shabaab and al-Shabaab can’t do much for al-Qaeda. This
view is both wrong and right.
Robert Young Pelton, whose article inspired me to
write this piece, gave a rather truthful comment: “the truth is that
there is little love for Jihadists in Somalia these days. What
al-Shabaab knows only too well is that hitching your local uprising to
al-Qaeda may provide increased funding and visibility in the short term
but it also gets you the direct attention of the West and their very
energetic global kill or capture program.”
But let us recast first on a bit of history. In
1996, when Osama bin Laden formally announced al-Qaeda as a force
against Christians, Jews and “apostates”, he included Somalia in his
list of al Qaeda bases in the world. The other countries were Palestine,
Iraq, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippines, Ogaden,
Eritrea, Chechnya and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The problem is that bin Laden
was not a cleric and cannot issue Fatwas. He was well respected in jihad
circles but the agenda of Salafists may not have a place in Somalia.
Now, due to his up-side-down interpretation of
Islam, Godane, the al-Shaabab radical leader, who announced the merger
hoped he could get operational capital from the alliance.
Godane himself had been involved in failed attacks on Puntland,
the semi autonomous Somali State in the north east in 2008. His failure
at leadership has always been a source of in-fighting within al-Shaabab.
He does not command much trust from the al-Qaeda network. Like Pelton
says, he will need to plan and execute something spectacular outside the
country to even get his full name spelled correctly.
On the other hand, the 1998 US embassy bombings in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the attacks on the USS Cole in Aden in
October 2000 and the Kampala attacks of July 11, 2010, make it clear to
everyone that al-Qaeda in East Africa is more than rhetoric. These
attacks point to the fact that the failed state of Somalia has partly
been responsible for the insecurity in the East African region.
Here are some examples. Whadi al Hage left Arizona
to work for bin Laden in 1992 and became his most trusted aide. Al Hage
moved to Kenya in 1994 and created his own cell. In the process, he
recruited Fazul Abdullah Mohammed. Fazul was a key planner of the 1998
embassy bomb plot and later the go-between for al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda.
He was killed at a checkpoint in Mogadishu in mid 2011.
In late 2006 during the Ethiopian invasion, Comoran
born Kenyan Fazul Mohammed sent his wife to Pakistan to contact bin
Laden to get support and advice in their fight against the Ethiopians.
In October 2006, the head of al-Qaeda in East
Africa, Bajabu, met with Fazul and another al-Qaeda operative, Saleh Ali
Saleh Nabhan, at Bajabu’s home. The three looked into launching repeat
attacks on US and Israeli embassies as well as attacks on Kenya’s
anti-terrorism headquarters in Nairobi, and the Mombasa. Bin Laden’s
advice was for the East African cell of al-Qaeda to step up their game
and therefore get bigger funding.
The relationship between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab
continued in a September 2008 video in which Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan
reached out to al-Qaeda’s top leadership for help and pledged allegiance
to al-Qaeda. This video may have inspired many more to join al-Shabaab.
Many of these volunteers were killed, and three were used as suicide
bombers against Amisom in the 2009. Since then, al-Shabaab leadership
has continued to work with al-Qaeda and this is why one should take the
merger very seriously.
However, the arrogant and violent approach of
al-Qaeda does not endear the group to Somalis. It is important to
remember that the history and goals of al-Qaeda are as foreign to
Somalis as they are to the entire world. This gives hope for the success
of Amisom and the world should support this African initiative to
restore the State of Somalia.